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 i 
ABSTRACT  
---- 
 
From July to September 1978, the Marathwada region experienced intense levels 
of violence following the decision to rename Marathwada University into Dr. Babasaheb 
Ambedkar University. In a crushing display of upper-caste power, thousands of dalits 
were killed, raped and made to flee their homes. Deep feelings of uncertainty and fear 
lingered on for several months after. The question of why a matter so ostensibly trivial as 
renaming a university incited so much violence is a perplexing one. It cannot be 
answered by merely reducing the violence to “an imposition of high caste authority.” The 
rise of dalit self-assertion movements – inspired by Ambedkar – had resulted in dalits 
demanding their rights, liberating themselves from their age-old oppression by making 
use of affirmative action schemes, and moving from rural to urban sectors in search of 
new jobs. The complex structural undercurrents of this issue lay in the severe 
underdevelopment of Marathwada, the concentration of wealth and ownership in the 
hands of the rural political elite, strained agrarian relations, opportunistic identity politics, 
and the overwhelming poverty faced by large sections of the population – all of which are 
as ubiquitous today as they were forty years ago.  
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PREFACE 
---- 
 
I have lived most of my life in Mumbai, but I have never had the opportunity to 
engage in a serious, critical analysis of the many divisive problems that characterize 
Indian society and culture. I have experienced how incredibly normalized modern caste 
and class discrimination have become; one does not have to look very far to see the 
burning presence of deep-rooted inequality and injustice. Opportunistic identity politics 
and an inequitable concentration of wealth and power are perhaps inevitable in a country 
as diverse as India. This paper is a modest attempt at highlighting the extent and 
complexity of the most pressing issues of our time, placing at its center those that are 
most marginalized by society.  
Conducting research for this thesis proved difficult and I had many limitations in 
the sources I could find and the amount of information I could present within this 
narrative. Although this paper centers the riots of 1978, it is far from being over and 
remains an ongoing intellectual endeavour. I was not able to conduct interviews of my 
own, but I use several secondary-source interviews and observations to synthesize my 
analysis. I researched extensively and read work from a variety of different perspectives, 
but the majority of sources have come from Economic and Political Weekly, a left-
leaning editorial journal that mostly publishes in English. I have maintained a critical 
perspective on everything I have read, but it is important to note that this thesis does not 
claim to be nor does it try to remain neutral; it is on the side of those brutally oppressed 
by an inexcusable hegemonic system that seeks to preserve a violent status quo.  
 v 
I came across this poem, written at the height of the “Dalit Renaissance.” It has 
stuck with me through the course of this research, and inspired me to push harder in the 
toughest moments of this process. It is the most poignant, brave and sincere articulation 
of everything that is at the heart of this thesis:  
 
Mother 
I have never seen you 
Wearing one of those gold-bordered saris 
With a gold necklace 
With gold bangles 
With fancy sandals 
Mother! I have seen you 
Burning the soles of your feet in the harsh summer sun 
Hanging your little ones in a cradle on an acacia tree 
Carrying barrels of tar 
Working on a road construction crew… 
 
I have seen you 
With a basket of earth on your head 
Rags bound on your feet 
Giving a sweaty kiss to the naked child 
Who came tottering over to you 
Working for your daily wage, working, working… 
 
I have seen you 
Turning back the tide of tears 
Trying to ignore your stomach's growl 
Suffering parched throat and lips 
Building a dam on a lake… 
 
I have seen you 
For a dream of four mud walls 
Stepping carefully, pregnant 
On the scaffolding of a sky scraper 
Carrying a hod of wet cement on your head… 
 
I have seen you 
In evening, untying the end of your sari 
For the coins to buy salt and oil, 
Putting a five paise coin 
On a little hand 
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Saying 'go eat candy' 
Taking the little bundle from the cradle to your breast 
Saying "Study, become an Ambedkar" 
And let the baskets fall from my hands… 
 
I have seen you 
Sitting in front of the stove 
Burning your very bones 
To make coarse bread and a little something 
To feed everybody, but half-fed yourself 
So there would a bit in the morning… 
 
I have seen you 
Washing clothes and cleaning pots 
In different households 
Rejecting the scraps of food offered to you 
With pride 
Covering yourself with a sari 
That had been mended so many times 
Saying "Don't you have a mother or a sister?" 
To anyone who looked at you with lust in his eyes… 
 
I have seen you 
On a crowded street with a market basket on your head 
Trying always to keep your head covered with the end of your sari 
Chasing anyone who nudged you deliberately 
With your sandal in your hand… 
 
I have seen you working until sunset 
Piercing the darkness to turn toward home, 
Then forcing from the door 
That man who staggered in from the hooch hut… 
 
I have seen you 
At the front of the Long March 
The end of your sari tucked tightly at the waist 
Shouting "Change the name" 
Taking the blow of the police stick on your upraised hands 
Going to jail with head held high… 
 
I have seen you 
Saying when your only son 
Fell martyr to police bullets 
"You died for Bhim, your death means something" 
saying boldly to the police 
"If I had two or three sons, I would be fortunate. 
 vii 
They would fight on." 
 
I have seen you on your deathbed 
Giving that money you earned 
Rag-picking to the diksha bhumi 
Saying with your dying breath 
"Live in unity… fight for Baba… don't forget him… 
And with your very last breadth 
"Jai Bhim." 
I have seen you… 
 
I have never seen you 
Even wanting a new broad-bordered sari 
 
Mother, I have seen you… 
 
By Jyoti Lanjewar 
Translated by  
Sylvie Martinez, Rujita Pathre, S. K. Thorat, Vimal Thorat, and Eleanor Zelliot1  
 
 
 
 
																																																								
1 Vankar, Ganpat, “Mother: Jyoti Lanjewar.” Marathi Dalit Poetry in English 
Translation (blog), Blogspot, July 11, 2014, http://marathidalitpoetry.blogspot.com/ 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Marathwada Riots 
---- 
 
Smoke from the burning dalit bastis saturated the air. There was no clean water to 
be found in any well; they had been polluted by the bodies of slain children. Mutilated 
bodies of dalit women lay scattered at the edge of the jungles they had been fleeing to. 
Those that had managed to escape survived on rotting sitaphals found on the forest floor. 
Hundreds of dalits were murdered. Countless more were severely beaten. Dalit houses 
and belongings were razed to the ground. This was the picture of Marathwada in 1978: a 
systematic and ruthless onslaught against the dalit community by caste Hindus in the 
region, incited ostensibly by the decision to rename Marathwada University after Dr. B. 
R. Ambedkar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Google Images, 2017 [‘Aurangabad Division’ and ‘Marathwada’ are interchangeable] 
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On July 27, 1978 – nine days after Sharad Pawar had taken office as the Chief 
Minister of Maharashtra – the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly unanimously passed a 
resolution to rename Marathwada University as Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar University.2 
The university was located in Aurangabad, which formed one of five main districts in 
Marathwada (the other four being Parbhani, Nanded, Beed, and Osmanabad). 
Marathwada as a whole was, and remains to this day, designated as one of the most 
‘backward’ regions of the state of Maharashtra. Spanning an area of around 65,000 km2 
with approximately 9,000 villages, the mostly-rural region was characterized by 
pervasive economic and industrial underdevelopment, with over a third of its population 
living below the poverty line and almost two-thirds illiterate. In the 1970s, the population 
of Marathwada was around 8 million. 16.25% of this population – or 1.3 million – were 
dalits. Of the dalits, 80% lived below the poverty line and only 19% were literate, against 
the 30% and 34% statewide statistic.3 Aurangabad was Marathwada’s only “big” city, yet 
it was only moderately developed in the decades after Independence. By the late 1970s it 
still faced a high unemployment rate, with an increasingly large trend of educated youth 
leaving the region in search of jobs in Mumbai – by contrast, the wealthiest city in India – 
only a few hours away. There were only two state-sponsored universities in Aurangabad 
(today it has about seven), one of which was Marathwada University, which had two 
main campuses. Ninety percent of the student body in the 200-acre Nagasena Vana, or 
																																																									 2 Atyachar Virodh Samiti, “The Marathwada Riots: A Report,” Economic and 
Political Weekly Vol. 14, No. 19 (May 12, 1979): 845, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4367590  (accessed May 7, 2017)  
3A person was classified as “literate” by legal measurement in Census data if they were 
able write out their full name. (1971-2001 Census)		
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Milind Campus, were dalits. This campus was run by the People’s Education Society, 
which Ambedkar himself had founded some decades earlier. Next to this ‘dalit’ campus 
stood the rest of the university, covering roughly 500 acres.4  
On the day the renaming was declared, the Students Action Committee (SAC) of 
the university – a group comprising mainly middle class, high-caste students – 
successfully declared a bandh5 against the renaming in Aurangabad and in the nearby 
towns of Nanded and Beed.6 It was not long before violent demonstrations and attacks 
against public property in all major locations of these towns broke out. The cities and 
towns did not suffer any direct fatalities; however, several dalits were savagely beaten up. 
Those that spoke out in favour of the renaming or against the riots – mainly professors 
and academics from the university – were also subjected to intense assaults. In 
Aurangabad, bridges, buses and main traffic junctions were blown up, halting all social 
life. In Parbhani City, telephone lines were cut and dalit homes were attacked with rocks 
and pellets. In other urban towns, busts of Ambedkar were smashed or decorated with 
garlands made of shoes – a symbol of great disrespect. These incidents went on for a few 
days. The police rarely intervened to stop the rioters. In fact, in most cases, the police 
aided them and participated in the agitations enthusiastically. Dalit students were 
terrified, had nowhere to turn to, and did not return to school for several weeks. As the 
violence slowly subsided, the SAC announced that it would resume such agitations in 
September if the government failed to withdraw the proposal to rename the university.  																																																								
4 Abraham, Amrita, “A Report from Marathwada,” Economic and Political 
Weekly Vol. 13, No. 36 (September 9, 1978): 1538–1540, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4366931  (accessed February 3, 2017)  
5 A bandh, meaning “closed,” is a form of political protest where a political party or 
group declares a general strike of the entire city 
6 Ibid. 
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Meanwhile, the most alarming feature of these riots was actually their rapid 
spread to the surrounding villages. It was in the rural districts of Marathwada that the true 
devastation engendered by the riots was felt. Why student agitations for a matter so 
seemingly trivial – one that should have been a fairly contained university issue – gave 
way to such brutal violence even hundreds of kilometers away is a difficult and 
disconcerting question. In order to address it, the nature of the violence and the forces 
driving it need to be understood. The attacks on dalits here were nothing short of acts of 
terrorism, planned meticulously and executed with strategic intensity. The violence took 
many forms. In Sonkhed village, landlords set fire to forty-one dalit bastis and raped 
three female agricultural workers. In Sugaon, the dalit wells were poisoned with 
pesticide, which killed two people and caused over twenty to be hospitalized. In Bolsa, 
three women were raped and tortured before being killed. In Pongu, a new mother of a 
two-day old baby was raped and killed along with her child. In Yetala, two teachers were 
beaten to near-death in the Gram Panchayat office. In Temburni, two men were brutally 
murdered and their houses burnt to the ground. In Izzatgaon, five women running 
towards the forest were captured, raped and had their breasts cut off. In Pangri, mobs of 
men beat up women with lathis, burnt their houses and threw their children into the only 
well in the village.  
These incidents were neither isolated events nor were they stories of only some 
villages. In almost every affected village in Marathwada, dalits were killed and dalit 
women were raped. Their houses were gheraoed,7 pillaged and then set alight. Those 
houses that were not burnt to the ground were covered in bright blue paint and blue 																																																								
7 Gherao means “encirclement.” Typically used as a tactic where a group of people 
surrounded a house or political office until their demands were met.  
 5 
powder was sprayed everywhere – blue was the colour of dalit liberation. Dalit 
belongings were smashed with axes. They were forcefully shunted out of villages. Their 
wells were poisoned and their cattle were killed. This massacre ravaged on for sixty-seven 
days. In these two months, no help arrived for the dalits. Like in the urban sectors, in 
most villages the rioters were egged on and encouraged by the police patils.8 In Pangri, 
all the atrocities were committed “with the blessings of the patils.” In Kushnoor, four 
women were caught and raped, and one of their children was burnt to death – by a police 
patil and a group of his goondas9. Those policemen that did feel morally obligated to 
intervene were threatened by their high-caste “benefactors” to stay out of it, while many 
others were simply bribed off. In Nanded, the district that saw the most – and most 
intense – violence, many of the policemen had conveniently “taken the night off” – for all 
sixty-seven nights, it seemed.10  
Some time after the riots, the Parliamentary Committee was tasked with filing a 
report about the situation. They concluded that the police were, indeed, “mere spectators 
to the incidents,” and sometimes the “instigators.” Around 3000 people had been 
arrested, however, in the days following the end of the atrocities. But nearly all of them 
were released in order to instate  “peace and harmony.” The Committee recommended 
opening judicial inquiries into the cases, a note that was promptly refused. The 
Committee also found that although compensation was given to some affected dalits, it 
																																																								
8 Patil means “head” or “chief.” It is a last name (derived from the patil jati), native to 
Maharashtra. Many patils were typically warriors for the Maratha army.  
9 A goonda a South Asian English word meaning “hired thug.” It is used colloquially and 
within legislature.		
10 Atyachar Virodhi Samiti, 1979 
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was not nearly sufficient to mitigate the damages incurred.11 Neither was there any real 
effort to provide victims with emotional support, nor did the state attempt to foster any 
processes of truth and reconciliation.  
In 1955, the Untouchability (Offenses) Act was passed, and “revamped” in 1976 
as the Protection of Civil Rights Act (PCR). This act contained provisions to curb and 
prevent atrocities against scheduled castes and tribes.  At the time of the riots, the PCR 
was in effect, and yet there was absolute silence from the government as dalits were 
being tortured and killed right under their noses. Weeks after the attacks stopped, the 
official government response to the problem of relocation and rehabilitation of displaced 
dalits was that it would “not always [be] possible” and if done too soon it would 
“exacerbate tensions.” This willfully apathetic response from the state persisted until 
many political parties and interest groups saw the riots as a political opportunity to 
expand their vote banks and consolidate local power. It was only when the next round of 
elections came around that these parties made big promises for reconciliation. But the 
damage had already been done, and no real reparations were ever made. 
When the dust settled, the Parliamentary Committee found that 1200 out of the 
9000 villages in Marathwada were affected. 5000 people from over 1000 villages were 
displaced without anywhere to take shelter, forced to flee their homes with nowhere to 
go. 2000 of them fled to either jungles or cities, where it was assumed they either 
perished out of starvation in the wild or lived out their lives in abject hunger and poverty 
on the streets. The terror that most dalits felt at the thought of returning prevented them 
from even considering it, despite being subject to starvation and abysmal living 
																																																								
11 Ibid. 
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conditions. According to the reports of the Atyachar Virodh Samiti (another fact-finding 
committee created to report the atrocities in the riots), 25,000 dalits said they were 
“reduced to a totally demoralized, helpless condition.”12  
 Breeding these feelings of helplessness and dejection among dalits was one of the 
primary goals of the caste Hindu agitators, both in the urban and rural sections of 
Marathwada. Caste tensions have deep roots in India’s sociopolitical and cultural 
landscape, and dalits are certainly no strangers to upper caste violence. The 1970s in 
particular saw a steady onslaught on dalits. During Indira Gandhi’s “decade of 
development” and the subsequent nineteen-month Janata Party rule, the recorded cases of 
atrocities against dalits totaled almost sixty thousand across India,13 with presumably 
several thousands more that went unreported. Maharashtra was one of five states in the 
country where atrocities were the greatest. But to ascribe innate “caste conflict” as the 
sole cause of the Marathwada riots is perfunctory at best. Instead, it is useful to situate 
caste as an implicit force that determines social, cultural and political life and forms the 
undercurrent for a number of other developments and trends, which have less to do with 
traditional divisions of labour and more to do with political and economic power. One of 
these ‘trends’ was the emergence of dalit movements that had gained significant traction 
by the 1970s. They were fiercely spearheaded, and later inspired, by Ambedkar and his 
teachings.  
The first part of this thesis explores the history and role of Ambedkar in shaping 
dalit consciousness and the subsequent dalit movements that underwrote dalit politics in 
the latter part of the twentieth century. The second zooms in on the issue of Namantar – 																																																								
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
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or renaming – and discusses the factors that led up to the demand, how it was 
spearheaded by the Dalit Panthers, and what its implications were for campus culture. It 
then explores the other side of the renaming proposition: the political forces that resulted 
in the upper-caste government agreeing to meet the demand, and why there was such a 
forceful drive against removing the word “Marathwada” from the name. The third section 
– the core of this paper – analyzes the deep-rooted historical, geopolitical and economic 
structures that underwrite the entire renaming violence, including severe 
underdevelopment, contradictions arising from the implementation of reservations for 
dalits, agrarian land issues, agricultural labour, and the role of big industries and capitalist 
agriculture. Finally, the fourth and fifth sections offer some comments on the caste/class 
debate in the Marathwada context and the future of dalit liberation politics.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Rising Tide of Ambedkarian Self-Assertion  
---- 
 
To the upper caste Hindus of Marathwada, renaming the university after 
Ambedkar was a massive symbolic defeat. For dalits, it was a huge, unprecedented 
victory. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (14 April 1891 – 6 December 1956), himself a dalit, 
was an accomplished jurist, scholar, economist, politician and activist. He was India’s 
first law minister as well as the “chief architect” of India’s Constitution, which is still in 
effect today. Built into his Constitution was a large set of legal protections for the nearly 
1,000 “scheduled castes” living in India. Many of these protections took the form of 
affirmative action policies or “positive discrimination” laws like specific quotas and 
reservations for lower castes in educational institutes and major employment sectors; 
empirically, they often had a dual effect on the lives of dalits, a discussion that will be 
addressed later. Nonetheless, throughout his life, Ambedkar remained a strong, tireless 
advocate for the rights of dalits, women and workers on a public platform.  
Although it was his predecessor, Jyotirao Phule – another critical thinker and 
social reformer who fought for peasant rights, women’s education and the abolition of 
untouchability in the 1800s – who first used the term ‘dalit’ as a signifier of the 
oppression faced by lower castes, it was Ambedkar who popularized it into the evocative 
word it is today. It is important to understand that ‘dalit’ does not refer to a single 
endogamous unit, nor is it an undifferentiated homogenous group. While it was certainly 
 10 
Ambedkar’s hope and goal to have ‘dalit’ mean a unified and integrated community 
fighting against the oppression of the caste system, the word itself, meaning “broken 
people,” refers to a constructed identity and is deeply political in nature. Unlike the 
inherently oppressive term “untouchable,” or Gandhi’s hypocritical and ultimately 
meaningless euphemism “harijan” (meaning “people of God”), ‘dalit’ is a widely used 
self-identifier, laden with a sentiment of empowerment, a symbol of change and 
revolution that rejects the subjugation and subhuman status imposed on dalits by the 
Hindu social order – interpretations that are largely credited to Ambedkar. While the term 
is frequently used interchangeably with “scheduled castes” or other such legal 
categorizations, just as I will use it in this paper along with “Untouchable” (with the 
acknowledgement of its history and significance), it cannot be assumed that every person 
who identifies as dalit shares a common revolutionary goal. Even within the dalit 
community there are hundreds of jatis14, operating within their own hierarchy whose 
internal divisions are similar to those of the upper castes. Certain dalit jatis are relatively 
privileged in comparison to their counterparts; for instance, the garodas (“gurus” or 
teachers) are on the top of the ladder whereas the bhangis (scavengers or rag pickers) are 
at the very bottom. Similarly, the different sub-castes within the dalit strata include those 
such as Mahars, Mangs or Matangs, Chamars and Senwas, each derived from a 
corresponding traditional occupation. Their status within the dalit community depends 
largely on their location and geopolitical history. In Maharashtra, the Mahars have always 
been a relatively “higher” jati amongst the Untouchables, but it was only after 
																																																								
14 A jati, unlike caste, is a single endogamous group of clans, tribes, communities or sub-
communities, typically reflected by last name. 
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Ambedkar’s rise as a national leader that the Mahars garnered the political consciousness 
and social capital to become a dominant identity group. 
--- 
Ambedkar was born into a poor Mahar family at a time when Mahars were legally 
regarded as Untouchables, undifferentiated from other dalits in the Hindu perspective. In 
his childhood, Ambedkar was subjected to a great deal of social discrimination. As was 
the case in most of India, Untouchable children like himself were made to sit separately 
from the rest of the class in school – if they were able to go at all – and were often bullied 
by their peers and disregarded by the teachers. When they wanted to drink water, a 
higher-caste person had to pour it into their glass from a height, so as to not accidentally 
touch the water or the glass being held by the Untouchable child, lest the “pollution” 
spread. These were only some of the day-to-day manifestations of the cultural violence 
dalits faced.  
Ambedkar’s family moved to Bombay a few years later, where he became the 
first Untouchable to be enrolled in high school, and then college. Educated abroad in 
Columbia University and then the London School of Economics, Ambedkar used his 
education to try and inspire other dalits to follow a similar path. Eventually, those efforts 
turned into a full-fledged movement against untouchability, and from that many 
subsidiary factions arose. His first public struggle was to make public drinking water 
sources available to everyone, including dalits. In most villages almost until the end of 
the twentieth century, dalits were not allowed to use the main well or water tank of the 
village. They were either assigned one for themselves, or had to walk for hours to get 
water. In 1927, Ambedkar led the Mahad satyagraha against this practice, where a 
 12 
number of Untouchables drank “high caste water” defiantly. It was in honour of this 
satyagraha’s fiftieth anniversary that the demand to rename the university was made. 
Ambedkar burnt copies of the ancient Manusmriti (Laws of Manu) – the “handbook” of 
Hindu caste system, so to speak – in a public conference with his followers in order to 
demand entry of dalits into Hindu temples. Needless to say, this outraged the broader 
Hindu community across the country. They saw in Ambedkar a belligerent and 
sacrilegious threat to the ‘natural’ order of Indian society, and opposed his ideology with 
the same ferocity that makes the caste system so hegemonic in the first place. 
Eventually, Ambedkar stopped working within the Indian social system (which 
was essentially a Hindu system) and publicly declared his contempt for Hinduism and 
vowed to “never die a Hindu”, asserting that as a religion it perpetuated caste injustice 
and violence. Subsequently, he published his book, The Annihilation of Caste, in which 
he forcefully criticized prominent Hindu religious leaders like Mahatma Gandhi who 
were widely revered by the non-dalit population of the country. Ambedkar and Gandhi 
were strong adversaries when it came to the caste system. This is not surprising seeing as 
Gandhi’s views on caste were contradictory and extremely problematic given his title as 
the “Father of the Nation.” That is not to say his efforts in the fight for independence, his 
nonviolence movement, or even most of his other beliefs and teachings were not 
important; however, he was a man of many inconsistencies with immense power to shape 
discourse of the time. And power must always be held to account, especially when the 
mainstream narrative of history had conveniently brushed it aside. Gandhi proclaimed 
that caste was a necessary – and natural – means of control. This stood quite 
paradoxically against his writings and talks on swaraj (self rule), whereby he encouraged 
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people to live their lives guided by their own sense of morality rather than ascribing to 
any imposed rules. Even if one were to set aside his racist and imperialist beliefs during 
his time in South Africa – giving him the benefit of doubt as someone who may have 
become ‘enlightened’ after joining the Indian Freedom Movement – his reluctance to 
speak out explicitly against caste discrimination or Brahmin imperialism, instead veiling 
it in a weak plea to foster “dignity of labour” without ever addressing the very reasons 
why some labour was considered so undignified, was indicative of where his true 
loyalties lay.  
Ambedkar unabashedly called him out on these beliefs. His criticisms were a 
huge source of anger for caste Hindus. He was anti-Hindu and specifically anti-Brahmin, 
which incited tensions across the country. Ambedkar asserted that the very idea of 
Brahminism – not necessarily the Brahmins themselves – was the actual problem. 
“Untouchable” in a sharply different sense, the feeling of Brahminism was one of 
entitlement, privilege and superiority that was unattainable to the rest of the people, one 
that everyone desired desperately but could never have. To compensate, people cherished 
their position in whichever social hierarchy they ascribed to – yielding power over 
whoever was beneath them. Ambedkar called this the “infection of imitation”: in the 
desire to be Brahmin, even the dalits at the bottom discriminated, humiliated and 
oppressed those who were just lower than them. “Each class being privileged, every class 
is interested in maintaining the system.”15 By waging a war against this idea of 
Brahminism, Ambedkar had effectively alienated and invited heaps of backlash from 
Brahmins and other upper castes. Most importantly, he identified one aspect of the caste 																																																								
15 Ambedkar, B. R. Annihilation of Caste. Introduction by Arundhati Roy, New 
York, Verso: 2016, 51  
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dimension – the infection of imitation – that illuminated in part the challenges to 
fostering caste and class unity, discussed later. The persistence of the caste system in 
contemporary India in large part is the unwillingness of Hinduism to evolve and adapt to 
a changing world. Ambedkar was far ahead of his time in his radical demands for reform. 
But it is now as it was then: Hinduism cannot function without its indispensable social 
order, or so it was adamantly professed. This was one of the pillars of Ambedkar’s 
opposition to Hinduism as a whole.  
In 1956, Ambedkar converted to Buddhism himself and inspired millions of his 
followers, 90% of whom were Mahars16, to do the same. Because of his untimely death 
only a few months after his conversion, the movement lost the momentum he had hoped 
for. Nonetheless, of the approximately eight million Buddhists in India today, nearly six 
million are Buddhists in Maharashtra. While Buddhists comprise 6% of the population of 
Maharashtra, they still total only 1% of the country’s population. Buddhist revival – or 
the Dalit Buddhist Movement as it came to be known – only truly caught on in 
Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh. Still, Ambedkar’s legacy is ubiquitous and his efforts are 
prominently visible in most aspects of the Indian political and cultural system today. The 
culmination of Ambedkar’s ideas, beliefs, writings, speeches, negotiations and acts of 
resistance shaped large-scale consciousness building into what is now called the dalit 
self-assertion movement. Even if the mass-conversion to Buddhism was not as successful 
as Ambedkar had imaged it to be, he had put onto the table something that had never 
been there before. Particularly in Maharashtra, dalits were emboldened to exercise their 																																																								
16 Gupta, Dipankar. “Understanding the Marathwada Riots: A Repudiation of 
Eclectic Marxism.” Social Scientist Vol. 7, No. 10 (May, 1979): 3–22, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3516774 (accessed March 10, 2017)  
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agency; for the first time in history they rejected their internalized inferiority, demanded 
justice and allowed themselves to fight for their dreams. Oppression can only survive 
through silence, and finally the silence of a few millennia was being broken. Dalits began 
to use legal and political avenues to fight the subjugation they had experienced for 
generations. Mahars began to give up their “unclean” and “defiling” jobs, which only 
mildly inconvenienced their upper caste employers but still sparked an aggressive 
reaction.17 The mood of self-assertiveness had reached almost all dalit communes, but the 
beating heart of the movement stayed predominantly with the Mahars. The Mangs and 
Chamars, who did not have even the slight advantage of being Mahars, often took up the 
degrading jobs that the Mahars were giving up and as a result inter-dalit divisions became 
inevitably more pronounced.  
As the Indian economy improved, the dalits in traditional occupations – like the 
Mangs and Chamars – were able to achieve modest economic betterment within their 
own professions and skillsets. These improvements did not materially affect higher 
castes, and so the non-Mahar dalits faced little hostility from above. The Mahars, 
however, did not have a particular, traditionally ascribed occupation and so were 
typically holders of gaonki and kotwalki jobs, the duties of which included cleaning the 
village, removing animal carcasses and patrolling the town for security at night. These 
jobs and thus the Mahars were vital to the administrative apparatus of villages; they were 
given some watan lands18 for self-cultivation and a rudimentary education in order for 
them to do their jobs with upper castes effectively. Along with some concession schemes 																																																								
17 Ibid.  
18 A watan was a hereditary rent-free grant given to a village resident in lieu of services 
that the resident was expected to perform for the village on an ongoing basis. It was 
continued for as long as the holder had the confidence of the village community. 
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implemented by the British, the Mahars were exposed and socialized into the 
contemporary political order, allowing them to avail of affirmative action opportunities 
that arose later in a more efficient way than other dalit groups.19 Once they began giving 
up these jobs, the only way to propel themselves out of their subjugation was through 
competing with the upper caste petty bourgeoisie for bureaucratic jobs, for which they 
had now been equipped. Upper caste Hindus as a result felt their “traditional way of life 
was being threatened by the ‘upstart’ and ‘lowly’ Mahar community.” Widespread 
unemployment and economic insecurity prompted this Mahar-caste Hindu conflict, which 
gradually turned into a long cultural war with a deep caste dimension, with ideological 
tension building up on both sides. The illustrious account of Ambedkar’s radically 
inspiring life and work is of crucial importance in understanding the sentiment behind the 
dalit campaign to rename the university after him. The self-assertion movements that 
arose through the post-Independent era had resulted in demands for changing the status 
quo of Hindu society, of liberating dalits from their modern-day feudal shackles. 
Ambedkar was a symbol of this radical dialectic. He and his ideas were perceived as 
direct threats to caste Hindus, who in turn responded with ferocity and aggression to 
squash all feelings of empowerment among the dalits, literally in the case of the 
Marathwada riots, but also structurally in the dominant, hegemonic upper caste Indian 
political system.  
  
 
 
																																																								
19 Gupta, 1979 
 17 
CHAPTER TWO 
The (Re)Name Game 
 
---- 
 
 
Dalit Movement to Rename Marathwada University 
Ambedkar’s powerful legacy and the emerging self-assertiveness of his followers 
makes clearer why dalit students at Marathwada University wanted the college renamed 
after their leader. Given the lack of development in the region, the student body in 
general had many qualms about the university administration. In 1974, progressive youth 
organizations on campus organized what came to be known as the Marathwada Vikas 
Andolan, a struggle for increased regional development and opportunities.20 Renaming 
the university after Ambedkar was one of the group’s demands, and both dalit and non-
dalit students – including the SAC – were united in these protests, albeit for different 
reasons. The SAC’s interests in the renaming lay not in any sympathy for the dalit 
struggle but rather to try and bring them into the general quota of students, in turn getting 
rid of dalit quotas and the affirmative action system altogether. Their main concerns 
involved the student body as a whole and as a result their efforts focused on demanding 
lower school fees, cheaper textbooks and affordable dorming facilities. For the dalit 
students, who comprised 26% of the total university’s population, the renaming was an 
issue of symbolic importance. Since their educational expenses were often subsidized or 																																																								
20 Sirsat, Prakash. “In Memoriam, Namavistar – Contours of the Namantar 
Struggle for Renaming of Marathwada University.” Sanhati. January 13, 2015. 
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covered by the government, they were indifferent to and rarely participated in the SAC-
led campaigns.21 The non-dalit students supported the renaming this time expecting a 
quid pro quo from the dalits who comprised over a quarter of the school. Had each group 
shown solidarity and empathy toward the other’s causes, perhaps such a “transactional” 
civil society in the student body would not have been the norm. But be as it were, in the 
years leading up to the Marathwada riots the student body remained unified, strategically 
if not ideologically as they protested for common causes. 
 Several political student groups were active in Marathwada University at the time. 
The Dalit Yuvak Aghadi was one such group, whose politics remained independent from 
the university as well as the government. Their demands included the renaming but not as 
a primary demand; most political dalit groups that were active were organizing for other, 
more pressing concerns such as dalit access to gairan lands (village commons), shared 
public wells, and better-funded scholarships for students.22 What really spurred the 
demand for renaming was the involvement of the Dalit Panthers – a revolutionary dalit 
organization founded in Bombay in 1972 – who spearheaded the call to action and led the 
protest through till 1978 and for some years after. There are conflicting narratives about 
the role and nature of the Dalit Panthers in this issue. According to Y.B. Damle, a 
professor of sociology and scholar on dalit politics, the renaming movement reflected the 
dalit students’ “burning dissatisfaction and discontent with the state of affairs”23 and was 
one that would have been tenacious even without Dalit Panthers’ influence. Other 
scholars and fact-finding groups place the Dalit Panthers at least partially responsible – 																																																								
21 Gupta, 1979 
22 Sirsat, 2015 
23 Damle, Y.B. “Holocaust in Marathwada: 1978.” ICSSR Research Abstracts 
Quarterly Vol. 13, No. 1–2 (January-June 1994): 117–121.  
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advertently or not – for the onslaught of violence during the subsequent riots and its 
aftermath. The Dalit Panthers’ work, like the state government’s decision to rename the 
university, must be understood in context of its own history and conception and in its 
relationship to other political developments in Maharashtra and the country.   
Shortly before Ambedkar’s death in 1956, he instructed his followers to form the 
Republican Party of India (RPI) as a class-based, liberal democratic political party. But 
within a year different factions began to break off from it. Without a “towering 
personality” like Ambedkar, the RPI could not attract followers from other castes outside 
of the Maharashtrian dalit Buddhist constituency. With the lingering fear of being 
swallowed up by a caste-Hindu majority, the RPI’s hold, like that of many other radical 
groups, eventually petered out.24 The vacuum in dalit representation was then filled by 
the creation of the Dalit Panthers. 
Inspired by and modeled after the Black Panter Party in the USA, the Dalit 
Panthers were a revolutionary socialist, anti-Brahmin, and anti-caste organization. They 
defined dalits as “all those who [were] exploited politically, economically and in the 
name of religion.” They fought fiercely for dalit liberation through the practice of 
“radical politics outside the framework of both parliamentary and Marxist-Leninist 
politics, fusing Ambedkar, Phule and Marx.”25 Under their leadership, Dalit literature, 
painting and theatre that challenged traditional depictions of Hindu society flourished. 
This “renaissance of Marathi art” formed part of the organized struggle against the 
																																																								
24 Pandit, Nalini. “Caste and Class in Maharashtra.” Economic and Political 
Weekly Vol. 14, No. 7–8 (February 1979): 425–436, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4367360  
(accessed February 19, 2017)	
25 Dalit Panthers. “Dalit Panthers Manifesto.” Raiot. January 23, 2016. 
http://raiot.in/dalit-panthers-manifesto  
 20 
“Hindu feudalist” state of modern India, alongside rallies, marches and, in particular, 
direct militant action against their upper-caste aggressors. 
Dalits fighting to reform social structures are fighting an asymmetrical war. It is 
perhaps unsurprising that the Dalit Panthers took up arms and turned “militant.” In the 
words of Frantz Fanon: “colonization is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield 
when confronted with greater violence.”26  The DP’s radical goals of overthrowing the 
state – putting the “people” in power, redistributing wealth, and ridding upper caste 
Hindus of their control over state machinery and means of production – quite naturally 
turned to the revolutionary violence that Fanon speaks of, and the DPs employed poetic 
and fiery language to mobilize their followers. Their manifesto boldly proclaimed that 
“[through] legalistic appeals, requests, demands for concessions, elections, [and] 
satyagraha, society will never change. Their ideas of social revolution and rebellion 
would be “too strong for paper-made vehicles of protest,” and would instead “sprout in 
the flower of the mind with the full force of steel-strong means.”27 
In urban Marathwada, the Dalit Panthers had a relatively unwavering following 
through the 1970s. The second wave of demands for renaming Marathwada University 
was strictly the “dominion” of the Dalit Panthers; participation from others was 
minimal.28 They spearheaded the demand for renaming the University, claiming it as the 
first major step in gaining political power.29 Nonetheless, a march involving both dalits 
and non-dalits was planned by the “strategically unified” student body, independent of 
the DPs, to petition the university council for the change. . However, this procession ran 																																																								
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into a separate rally led by Gangadher Gadhe, one of the main leaders of the Dalit 
Panthers. Gadhe at this point went on a “vituperative tirade” full of caste abuses directed 
at the non-dalit majority present, insisting that all the credit for the name change go only 
to the dalits. He was backed by the Dean of the Law College, Sadhan Shiv, who was also 
a Mahar. The two men urged the dalit students to break away from the non-dalits. The 
non-dalits, meanwhile, were irritated by this treatment and did not hesitate to cut ties. 
This resulted in each side becoming more suspicious and antagonistic of the other. This is 
where the Dalit Panther-created rift begins, the one responsible for the inflammatory and 
“deep polarization” on the campus mentioned earlier. Dipankar Gupta emphasizes that 
this split was “not so much [initiated] by caste Hindu prejudices and reticence to support 
the renaming of the University, but rather by the splittist and sectarian position taken by 
Gadhe.”30 He also states that Gadhe’s position likely came about due to the fear that the 
unity between non-dalits and dalits would reduce his following, which has been the case 
for past organizations built primarily on “ascriptive lines.” 
Not only did Gadhe’s political stance create the preconditions for students 
“rushing headlong into a caste war”31 in the coming months, but the Dalit Panthers as a 
whole were careless in their involvement in the issue. Although dalit resentment towards 
upper castes is certainly an inflammatory matter and dalits were by no means passive 
observers in their own struggle, the renaming issue begs the question of whether 
demanding a new name for the university was a strategic, opportunist endeavour by the 
Dalit Panthers or indeed a “burning” passion and grassroots effort by Mahar students. 
The Dalit Panthers’ demands to the Maharashtra Legislature and the University 																																																								
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Executive Body to rename the university were not comprehensively planned; no effort 
was made to convince, or at least open up discourse with, opponents of the proposal. No 
attempts were made at anticipating consequences or long-term impact, although the 
magnitude of the riots and the meticulous nature with which they were carried out could 
not have been decisively envisaged. Nonetheless, once the riots broke out the Dalit 
Panthers did little to protect the lives of their dalit followers or mitigate the damage. 
Because their very existence as a political party was at stake, they were put in a “difficult 
position,” unable to send messages of support to the dalit masses or provide any help to 
resist the attacks.32 In a show of the crushing power of upper caste unity, the rioters 
controlled the press, several high-level political officials, police officers, professors, 
academics, the public majority, and even the dalit leadership; everyone had to come out 
with a clear stand on the issue, and anyone not on the side of the rioters was severely 
punished.  
The militant inclination of the DPs is understandable in context of the immensely 
aggressive and pervasive dominance of the upper castes, as manifested in the riots. The 
impassioned and galvanizing ideology of the DPs, evident in their manifesto, seemed like 
it could have provided sound roots upon which to build a strong and inclusive dalit social 
movement, violent or otherwise. But ideas alone don’t create change. The Dalit Panthers 
never had a spirited or even consistent leadership; for most of their existence as a 
Maharashtra-based party, they remained a largely disorganized and impetuous group 
without strategic long-term plans for making sustainable socioeconomic change. As a 
result they repeatedly garnered only a small fraction of the public support they required to 
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maintain a footing in regional politics. Their poor planning, lack of thoughtful leadership 
and power-hungry undertakings led them to assume “pseudo-radical postures [that] made 
symbolic demands which provoked rather than attracted the sympathetic or neutral 
elements from even the poorest strata of the caste Hindu population.”33 While the tenets 
upon which they were based never sought to include caste Hindus within their ranks – 
which was antithetical to what Ambedkar had imagined as a class-based party but in 
keeping with their own stated radical beliefs – their actions reflected less a radical Leftist 
agenda meant to assert dalit rights and more an opportunistic quest for political power 
within the Indian political landscape. Their intense militancy had gained them reputations 
as “slum dadas” who failed to live up to their credo and instead used violence for their 
own gain, which in turn had cost them a significant part of their constituency and failed 
to bring their loudly proclaimed plans for change to the dalit population.34 
 Nonetheless, the demand to rename Marathwada University did not fall on deaf 
ears the way most dalit demands had in previous decades. A number of political 
processes were taking place concurrently within the Indian government, nationally as 
well as regionally, which ultimately culminated in the passing of the renaming resolution 
– but not the renaming itself, which took sixteen years and many more protests, to 
actually come into effect. Both sides of the coin in the renaming issue have been tainted 
by opportunistic politics, a fight for power and electoral tactics. The way in which the 
DPs organized the dalits raises the question of whether it was truly successful in 
inculcating the same ferocity and conviction of self-assertiveness that began with 
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Ambedkar, and more pertinently, if the renaming of the university furthered dalit politics 
at all in a way that was productive for the community at large.   
 
On the Other Side: Why Pass the Resolution? 
 Given the sheer dominance of upper castes in the fabric of Indian society, the 
decision to rename Marathwada University seemed out of character. The fragmented 
mobilization of the DPs in the fight for renaming the university did not seem sufficient to 
cause the upper caste hegemony to acquiesce to dalit demands. An anti-dalit sentiment 
has always been rife among high caste Hindus, even if it did not always manifest itself as 
direct violence. Structural oppression of dalits and lower castes was apparent – and often 
deliberate – within state institutions, cultural traditions and political relations. That is not 
to say that Indian politics are always explicitly anti-dalit – after all the Indian 
Constitution was written by a dalit, abolished untouchability and offered many 
protections for subjugated communities – but the vested interests of the ruling caste-
Hindu elite were often antithetical to those of the dalit masses. Particularly in the case of 
Marathwada University, renaming the university after Ambedkar would certainly send a 
message of betrayal to the upper-caste following of the upper-caste leaders of the region. 
To understand then why the government chose to rename the university and subsequently 
the reasons for its violent escalation, it is important to trace the background and events 
leading up to the renaming, including a brief history of politics in the country. The anti-
dalit sensibility that was prevalent among the high caste majority in Marathwada, and 
more broadly in India, was controlled, curated and manipulated by the myriad of 
patronage-based political parties in the country, all engaged in a constant battle for 
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power. It is from these opportunistic politics inside the region and in the country that the 
decision to rename Marathwada University was made.   
Sharad Pawar had become the Chief Minister of Maharashtra only a few days 
before the renaming resolution was passed. Under the mentorship of former CM 
Yashwantrao Balwantrao, or Y.B., Chavan, Pawar had joined the Maharashtra 
Legislative Assembly in 1967 as a member of the then-undivided Congress Party. 
Formed in 1885, Congress is credited as being the first “modern nationalist movement” 
against the British Raj. In the pre-Independence era, one of Ambedkar’s efforts to 
promote the dalit cause was to represent scheduled castes interests to the British Round 
Table Conferences, in order to gain them political traction. While Brahmins and high 
caste Hindus in Congress, such as Lokmanya Tilak, who were involved in the 
Independence struggle emphasized political unity before social reform, public pressure 
from the dalit and scheduled caste communities forced Congress to take a more 
democratic and secular stance.35 Today the Congress is characterized as a “center-left, 
secular, democratic and socially liberal” party, but its regional leadership across India 
varies significantly in context of local circumstances and the political leanings of both the 
elected representatives themselves and their general constituencies.  
In the 1930s, Congress had taken on a very Gandhian nature; they used his 
principles of satyagraha, swaraj and dignity of labour to create long-term “constructive 
programmes” that sought to abolish caste inequality and form a united front against 
British rule. As a result, they had attracted large numbers of non-Brahmins, including 
many lower castes. In response, educated Brahmin classes in Maharashtra left to join the 
																																																								
35 Pandit, 1979 
 26 
Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), two Hindutva parties 
inspired by the rise of fascism in Europe.36 Since Independence, Congress as a whole has 
taken shape as a broad-based political party with several different wings, factions and 
political positions and affiliations through its history.  
In the years after Independence, free India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, governed Congress under similar political ideologies – mixed economy, 
secularism, socialist economic industrialization and global non-alignment. Succeeded by 
his daughter, Indira Gandhi, from 1966 onward the party underwent tumultuous changes. 
Having done poorly in the elections of 1967, Gandhi created her own faction of the 
Indian National Congress (known commonly as Congress (R), “R” for Reacquisition), 
which was supported by most Members of Parliament. The original Congress was 
renamed Congress (O), “O” for Organization. In the 1971 elections her party ran on a 
progressive “Garibi Hatao” (“Get Rid of Poverty”) platform and had a strong victory.37 
The party began to move further left and adopt socialism into their credo. The success of 
the Russian Revolution had influenced several liberal, mostly upper-caste, intellectuals to 
create Communist and Socialist parties whose following was drawn largely from the 
industrial proletariat. Non-Brahmin intellectuals also created Leftist parties, including the 
Peasants and Workers Party (PWP). But when faced with a dominant socialist Congress, 
the Indian Left’s reach was not far enough and their following not wide enough – 
especially in rural Marathwada – to differentiate them as uniquely democratic parties, and 
so they became irrelevant against Congress’s hegemonic rule. 																																																								
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In the mid-1970s, however, popular support for Indira Gandhi’s new Congress 
Party began to wane. Her government became increasingly more authoritarian and began 
attracting dissension from opposition forces, calling for her resignation. Instead, she 
crushed the opposition by ordering mass arrests of those participating in the unrest, in an 
attempt to restore order. In June of 1975, her government declared a State of Emergency 
that lasted twenty-one months. This was a period of draconian rule characterized by 
widespread oppression and abuse of power by members of her administration. 
Democracy was in effect suspended; a curfew was imposed, the media was largely 
suppressed and human rights abuses ran rampant. Finally, in January of 1977, mounting 
pressure against the suppression of civil liberties led Indira Gandhi to call for fresh 
elections and release all political prisoners. General voting took place in March 1977, and 
in those parliamentary elections the leading opposition Janata Party – essentially an 
amalgamation of all parties opposed to the Emergency – won a landslide victory over 
Congress. The first non-Congress government in the history of India, the Janata Party’s 
leader Morarji Desai became the new Prime Minister of India. The Party won 295 seats in 
the Lok Sabha (Lower House) against the Congress’ 153, and Indira Gandhi lost her seat 
in parliament. The end of the Emergency was also the end of the unchallenged thirty-year 
rule of the Indian National Congress in Independent India. 
The political situation in Maharashtra was consonant with the big changes taking 
place at the national level. Before Sharad Pawar’s first incumbency as CM in 1978, 
Congress had been the dominant party in the region since 1947. It was largely comprised 
of Maratha peasants united by “strong caste bonds.”38 “Maratha” referred to a group of 
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dominant castes native to the Maharashtra region as early as the sixteenth century, 
traditionally known to be great Hindu warriors and rulers. The Maratha Empire saw many 
different rulers, of which Shivaji’s reign in the late 1600s was perhaps the only time 
where a balance of power among castes existed.39 Since then, the upper-caste status of the 
Marathas has underwritten caste relations and power dynamics in the region, up until 
today. Congress-leader Y.B. Chavan was the Chief Minister of the British-created 
Bombay State from 1956-1960, and later of independent Maharashtra from 1960-1962. 
He was instrumental in the separatist Samyukta Maharashtra Movement, a separatist 
movement demanding linguistic freedom of Maharashtra from the Bombay state, which 
gained traction as a movement “that embraced every section of society, [including] 
peasants, workers, white-collar workers and the middle classes.”40 Chavan publicly 
emphasized that Maharashtra would be governed by the Marathi not Maratha people, in 
an era of Bahujan Samaj rule, i.e. that of the “embraced” majority of the common masses 
and not just the Maratha elites.41 However, in practice it became apparent that this appeal 
to the bahujan was only a display of “arrogance, opportunism and chicanery on part of 
the ruling Congress leadership,” as Chavan’s real motivations lay in establishing a 
dominant position of power for the Maratha caste-cluster that comprised 40% of 
Maharashtra. During his time as CM of Maharashtra, he set in motion a pervasive 
ideological system of Maratha-dominated politics under the guise of Bahujan rule, 																																																								
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attracting many non-Maratha castes in the process that consolidated the region as a 
Maratha stronghold. 
After her resounding loss in the 1977 General Elections, Indira Gandhi seceded 
from the Indian National Congress and formed an opposition party of her own, Congress 
(I), “I” for Indira. After Y.B. Chavan ended his term as Chief Minister in 1962, he 
remained with Indira Gandhi’s party as the Home Minister, Finance Minister and Foreign 
Minister consecutively – through the Emergency – until 1978 when Gandhi formed 
Congress (I) and Chavan chose to join her opposition rather than continue to align with 
her. Indira Gandhi’s post 1970-strategy was one of attracting lower castes/classes into 
Congress (I) so her campaign moved to appeal to dalit, tribal and Muslim vote banks in 
Maharashtra, but was unable to counter the Chavan-driven dominance of the Marathas 
even years after he had left office as CM.42 She had been attempting to break this 
Maratha lobby from 1972, and one of her tactics was to install Shankarrao Bhavrao, or S. 
B., Chavan as the CM in 1975. He was a Maratha, but was strongly opposed to Y.B. 
Chavan and worked dutifully under her wing. This caused a great deal of resentment and 
backlash from the Y.B. Chavan loyalist Marathas, who were able to defeat him and other 
local leaders who were loyal to Congress (I), proving the strength of Maratha dominance 
over that of the national leadership. This retaliation by the Marathas contributed to the 
downfall and factionalization of Congress and further strengthened the cultural hegemony 
and political power of the Marathas.  
 Maratha opposition had led S.B. Chavan to be replaced as CM by “modern 
Maratha strongman” Vasantdada Patil in May 1977. He, too, was part of Congress but 
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had no ideological ties to Indira Gandhi. A controversial freedom fighter who had 
advocated for armed resistance, Patil was welcomed in Maharashtra but had many 
pending criminal cases filed against him during the British Raj. With the Janata Party’s 
power on the rise nationally, the Congress had its eye on the dalit vote bank across the 
country. Patil, despite his reputation as a Maratha strongman, took an opportunistic 
position in light of national electoral trends. He saw in the longstanding demand by dalit 
constituencies to rename Marathwada University an easy way to fortify his own power as 
well as expand his following. He promised the renaming would occur that year – 1977 – 
to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Ambedkar’s Mahad satyagraha. However, he 
faced severe resistance from his Maratha followers and was unable to make any headway 
with the renaming issue.  
 As a result of Patil’s efforts, when Sharad Pawar took power, the renaming 
proposal had been in the works but put on hold. The same year, Pawar broke off from the 
Congress and formed an alliance with the Janata Party called the Progressive Democratic 
Front (PDF). After the Janata Party’s sweeping victory in the elections, they started off 
strong with an agenda to reverse Emergency-era policies by promoting rural economic 
activity and expanding agricultural production.43 During the Emergency, the Janata Party 
had formed as a coalition of various opposition groups – which included socialists and 
trade unionists as well as corporate businessmen and rich elite entrepreneurs. This made 
economic reforms particularly hard to achieve, especially in Maharashtra that comprised 
an already divided public. Under Sharad Pawar’s Janata Party-allied PDF, more efforts 
were made in favour of the upper-caste elitist majority. As a result, across Maharashtra 																																																								
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the Janata Party had earned itself a bad reputation among the dalits for being “socially 
reactionary.”44 In order to regain some of its lost dalit following, one of the Party’s first 
moves was to endorse and push for the renaming of the University. It was a tactical 
decision to regain the support of the region’s scheduled castes and refurbish its image. 
More importantly, it cost them no money at all and most of the logistical work had 
already been completed during Vasantdada Patil’s term. Some Janata Party members and 
some members of the University Council were hesitant to go forward with the renaming, 
but because they did not want to be deemed ‘reactionary’ once again, they said nothing.45 
Once the resolution passed, neither Pawar’s government nor the Dalit Panthers 
could have anticipated the intensity of the violence. Even though Congress had lost its 
seat in national and state politics, by no means had the party lost its power. In 1978 
Congress chose to align with the suvarnas and middle caste peasants in the PWP and 
even right-wing opposition parties like the Shiv Sena, not because they opposed the 
renaming on a fundamental level but because they wanted to get rid of Sharad Pawar 
after he cut ties with Vasantdada Patil and joined the Janata Party. Even in areas where 
local Congress leadership sympathized with the dalit cause, they did nothing in order to 
prevent jeopardizing their already-fragile caste Hindu vote banks.  
After the dust settled, Sharad Pawar’s government continuously found excuses to 
actually implement the renaming. If just the proposal to do so had sparked such an acute 
reaction, then there was no telling what would happen if the university’s name was 
actually changed in effect. The damage to public property in Aurangabad had proved 																																																								
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costly to an already-backward and impoverished region; the government did not want to 
waste more money at the expense of the dalits. When the riots finally ended, many of the 
dalits did not want to return to their homes because of horrific memories they had of the 
violence. The more educated and relatively wealthier dalits in the cities, especially 
student leaders, youth and DP followers, were cynical towards the rural reaction. They 
showed an urge to retaliate. They put up poetic and emotional posters depicting the 
atrocities across the cities and towns, in an effort to press for retaliation against the 
“horror of caste frenzy” that had been unleashed upon them.46 They restructured the 
campaign to rename the university as a social movement, called the Namantar Andolan 
(“Namantar” meaning “name change” and “andolan” meaning “social movement”). They 
used the now-world-famous slogan coined by Ambedkar, “Educate, Agitate, Organize,” 
to continue organizing rallies and demonstrations. They had to halt their efforts 
temporarily because of the extent of the violence in the rural areas, but resumed 
operations some months later. Growing tired of Pawar’s excuses, they organized a Long 
March from Deekshabhoomi, a sacred Buddhist monument and the site of Ambedkar’s 
conversion, all the way down to Aurangabad, set to end on December 6, 1979, the 
anniversary of Ambedkar’s death. Inspired by the Chinese Long March and attended by 
300,000 dalits from all over the country, this 470 km march was one of the strongest 
protests against the lack of human rights and one of the most powerful shows of dalit 
solidarity and assertion in India’s modern history. The protesters clashed with the police 
almost every step of the way; tens of thousands were arrested, lathi charged, fired on with 
air guns and tear gas, and severely beaten up. Only a small percentage made it to 
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Aurangabad, but nonetheless the march was immensely successful. The entire Namantar 
Andolan lasted sixteen years – until the University was finally renamed in 1994.  
But even in 1994, when the name of the university was officially changed, it was 
done so with one fundamental compromise; instead of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar 
University as originally demanded, the university was renamed Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar 
Marathwada University. Ostensibly, this was a minor adjustment, but the sub-regional 
identity associated with Marathwada was deep-rooted and formed part of the reason for 
the violence in 1978, and will be explained later. Sharad Pawar was once again the Chief 
Minister of Maharashtra, serving a third term from 1993-95. Progressive elements in his 
coalition MLA pushed to resolve the renaming issue, and the compromise in the name 
was approved unanimously by both sides within the government. However, the “tacit 
approval” by progressive forces within Pawar’s administration was given only because it 
was expected that the Dalit Panthers would reject the compromise, considering their 
history and reputation as resistant hardliners, and as a result the government would have 
time and space to “maneuver” the issue further.47 However, the DPs publicly accepted 
this compromise almost instantly, causing the pro-renaming elements to recant their 
position. In the words of Dalit Yuvak Aghadi leader Prakash Sirsat, the “Panthers did not 
possess the political acumen to understand their haste in making the announcement and 
eagerness to dialogue relatively early would change the power dynamics [of the issue]. 
They were not well versed in the drama of politics.”48 The acceptance of this compromise 
is what was said to have fueled another set of riots, less vicious than the ones in 1978 but 
nonetheless an indicator that the charged nature of this conflict was far from over. In 																																																								
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some sense, this rhetoric puts the blame for the violence on the Dalit Panthers because 
they acquiesced to a compromise rather than continued the fight. While the DPs were 
certainly not faultless in the issue, to blame the dalits for their own oppression is 
unacceptable. The blame for such intense violence falls squarely on the shoulders of none 
other than the people that participated in it, in large part constructed by the 
aforementioned dominating sub-regional identity.  
 
The “Marathwada” Psyche 
The politics of how exactly the renaming came about are clearer. The push to 
keep “Marathwada” in the name, however, points to a deeper issue that shaped the 
dominant ideology of the upper castes: the emergence of the ‘Marathwada psyche,’ a 
consciousness movement and a form of strong sub-regional identity that united the 
suvarnas and regional elites but intentionally excluded the dalits. This was not surprising 
given Marathwada’s political and linguistic history. 
Despite shared religious beliefs or cultural traditions, in a country as vast and 
diverse as India, different sub-regions naturally develop their own unique identities as a 
reflection of different histories, languages, social structures, political cultures and 
demographic features.49  In the social sciences, the concept of a “region” moves beyond 
physical geography to a more fundamental understanding of social and cultural linkage. 
At the root of regionalism, however, is the “region” as a purely territorial entity. The 
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feeling of belonging to a region as such, identifying with it and being loyal to it is what 
“regionalism” essentially means.  
When the decision to rename the university was announced, Govindbhai Shroff 
issued a report titled “Why Marathwada University Alone?” Shroff was one of the main 
forces of the regionalism movement. He was instrumental in the struggle against the 
Nizam of Hyderabad and was widely regarded as a “freedom fighter” in Marathwada. 
Under the title “social worker,” he served as the chairman of a trust that ran many 
educational institutions, comprised primarily of upper caste students. He was an avid 
supporter of the SAC and was one of the main leaders of the agitation against the 
renaming, according to a fact-finding report by the Parliamentary Committee. It was later 
claimed that he urged his followers to accept the name with nonviolence despite being 
opposed to it, while simultaneously petitioning to have the Prevention of Atrocities Act 
withdrawn in the early 1990s.50 In his report, Shroff argued that the dalits would not stop 
at the university and sought “hegemony over all aspects of life.” He said it was “utterly 
preposterous” to suggest that opposition to the renaming was because Ambedkar was a 
Mahar, yet he refused to accept the proposed compromise: Dr. Ambedkar Marathwada 
University. He then asserted that the renaming campaign was an “attempt to deny and 
efface the identity of Marathwada, deride and abuse its people, its history and culture and 
its struggles and achievements.”51 These statements are rather extreme, almost fanatical. 
They beg the obvious question: are the dalits living in the region not also the “people of 
Marathwada”? Shroff’s tirade conveniently and conspicuously leaves out any mention of 
Ambedkar, Buddhism, Untouchability or the dalit struggle as part of the region’s history 																																																								
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and culture. During the freedom movement against the Nizam of Hyderabad, many dalits 
in Marathwada aligned themselves with the Nizam “simply because they saw nothing to 
benefit from this independence.”52 Under his tutelage, the dalits were given repatriated 
land from the upper caste Hindus in exchange for their loyalty to the Hyderabad state. 
After independence, this land would be reclaimed by the Hindus. Ambedkar urged the 
dalits to give their loyalty to the liberation of India, but they did not follow his advice. 
The short-sighted opportunism of dalits was also responsible for exacerbating caste 
tensions instead of working towards unity. As a vanguard of the anti-Nizam struggle, 
Shroff had no interest in including the “disloyal” dalits in the cultural ethos of 
Marathwada. He was not unaware that dalits comprise nearly a fifth of the population, 
their exclusion was intentional and carried historical bitterness. Like the RSS, Shroff 
evoked in the majority Suvarna population a calculated image of a “golden age” where 
caste oppression flourished. 
According to D. N. Sandanshiv, Dean of the Law College in Marathwada 
University and comrade of Gangadher Gadhe, the atrocities only proved that it was the 
“unchallenged supremacy of the Manusmriti” which allowed such perceptions to even be 
seriously entertained. He argues that Shroff’s proclamations are simply “an exercise in 
self-justification” and the evocation of the Marathwada psyche is merely “old 
regionalism against modern nationalism.”53 This is an important claim; not only does it 
clarify how sub-regional identity was evoked by regional elites as a smokescreen for 																																																								
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caste prejudice, but it also brings into question if/how sub-regionalism can/should exist 
concurrently with the processes of modernism and nationalism. It is interesting to note 
that while nationalism seems like an obvious opponent to sub-regionalism, the two are 
not always mutually exclusive and it is not helpful to view the two as a stark dichotomy.  
In fact, from the 1960s until today, the Shiv Sena’s staunch Maharashtrianism always 
“coexisted with a strong Hindu nationalist undercurrent.”54 After Congress’s 
longstanding “secular government” was weakened in 1977, the “problem” with 
nationalism and nationalist politics in India was that it invariably became affixed to 
Hinduism. Ambedkar’s movement of mass conversion to Buddhism was in part because 
of his realization that Hinduism was an inherently violent religion. Hinduism formed the 
fetters that kept dalits subjugated for millennia. The development of intense sub-
regionalist ideology in Marathwada that pointedly excluded dalits was just as oppressive. 
The dalits were up – then and now – against an overwhelming caste Hindu majority that 
fought violently to preserve the status quo, occasionally under the guise of harmony. 
Shroff’s report went on to say that he found it “difficult to understand how an offensive, 
abusive and provocative approach [by the Dalits toward Suvarna ‘cultural heroes’] would 
help in the process of assimilation.”55 ‘Assimilation’ here is nothing but a euphemism for 
‘subservience.’ Dalits, particularly Mahars and neo-Buddhists, rejected Shroff’s “cultural 
heroes” and instead “were torn, as Ambedkar was, between notions of separate 
nationhood (Dalitisthans) and reconstructed social institutions.”56  
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--- 
The campaign to rename Marathwada University, and its ‘strategic’ approval 
within the framework of the state, posed a fundamental contradiction to the dalit 
movements. Given the complicity and opportunism that surrounded its politics, the 
important question then is whether the renaming issue was actually successful in 
furthering the dalit struggle. Some scholars have argued that in effect, the way the 
renaming was undertaken gave way to the “ghettoization” of the dalits and was in fact a 
regression of dalit politics. The leaders of the renaming struggle could not claim the 
victory as their own; it was not solely the demand that resulted in “success,” and there 
was by no means a change-of-heart or a genuine acceptance of and agreement with the 
dalit cause. On the other hand, for the average dalit, this was a small victory in what 
would always be an ongoing struggle. Jyoti Lanjewar’s poem to her mother evokes this 
sentiment perfectly: “At the front of the Long March / The end of your sari tucked tightly 
at the waist / Shouting ‘Change the name’ / Taking the blow of the police stick on your 
upraised hands / Going to jail with head held high.”  
The Marathwada riots were a symptom that should not be mistaken for the 
disease.57 The struggle to “cure the disease” – or reform the structures that instigated such 
levels of caste violence in Marathwada – requires, first, an understanding of what these 
structures are and how they manifested differently in the urban and rural spheres of the 
region. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Structures of Conflict 
---- 
 
 
Compounded Underdevelopment in Marathwada 
The state of Maharashtra is the second most populous state in the country (with 
over 112 million inhabitants currently). It is geographically divided into five major 
regions: Konkan, Paschim (Western) Maharashtra, Khandesh, Vidarbha and Marathwada. 
The state holds the distinction of having within its borders Mumbai – the wealthiest city 
in India, and the one with the highest GDP of any city in South, Central or West Asia – 
on the one hand, and Marathwada on the other. As mentioned earlier, Marathwada was 
characterized in the late 1970s by extremely high unemployment and illiteracy rates. 
Very little of the region was developed vis-à-vis infrastructure and institutional apparatus. 
The region’s mostly-rural population and economy depended excessively on agriculture, 
despite only 4% of its cultivatable land being irrigated, with sugarcane, cotton and 
sorghum as its main crops.  
For years the people of Marathwada had been resentful and frustrated at how each 
new elected representative for the region “was sorely out of touch with his rural 
constituency”58 and not doing anything to address the problem of underdevelopment that 
so deeply characterized life in Marathwada. The region had seen a chain of MLAs 
(Members of Legislative Assembly) drawn from some rural elite, their eyes set on 																																																								
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Bombay and therefore having little inclination to be in the cities of Marathwada, and no 
opportunity or attempt to “feel the pulse of the people.” Only two of Maharashtra’s Chief 
Ministers had been from Marathwada, resulting in a great lack of representation on the 
state and national levels.  
Furthermore, the urban upper/middle class was extremely resentful of Bombay 
because of the “favourable treatment” it continually received from the national 
government – in terms of public funds, infrastructure contracts, commercial trade and 
general development projects. When the resolution was passed to change the name of 
Marathwada University rather than any one of the several universities in Bombay, 
Nagpur or Pune, the urban bourgeoisie was furious. This issue once again proved to the 
people of Marathwada the persistent insensitivity towards regional consciousness from 
the leaders at the very top.59 In the 1970s there had been a large exodus of educated youth 
from the Konkan and Western Maharashtra regions moving to Bombay in search of jobs. 
For even the most well-educated students in Marathwada, going to Bombay was a distant 
dream. It was far, expensive and difficult to get to, and rarely did they have jobs waiting 
for people coming from Marathwada. This further fueled the anger at the lack of 
development, which in turn egged on the riots with more force. To understand why 
Marathwada remains stuck in a rut of “compounded backwardness,” it is useful to trace 
its illustrious history back a few centuries, explained only briefly here. 
Maharashtra was part of the great Maratha Empire across the eighteenth century, 
after the Marathas ended Mughal rule. By the early 1800s, the East India Trading 
Company took over, and the British government began to rule western Maharashtra as 
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part of the Bombay presidency. The rest of the Maratha region was divided into princely 
states that could retain their autonomy in exchange for acknowledging British rule. 
Marathwada was part of the princely state of Hyderabad, ruled by its Nizam, for nearly 
two hundred years before Independence. It was linguistically and socio-culturally 
different from the rest of the Nizam’s dominion, and as a result there was mounting 
public pressure for the linguistic reorganization of the states, particularly by the Marathi-
speaking Samyukta Maharashtra Movement. After a series of separatist movements that 
employed strikes, bandhs, hartals and street clashes, the central government gave into the 
pressure and in 1960 declared Maharashtra an independent state.  
The early 1960s saw the rise of state-sponsored private capitalist development in 
Maharashtra – but conspicuously not in Marathwada – that gave way to a number of 
“underworld” activities, including extortion, smuggling, trafficking and contraband 
peddling particularly in urban centers.60 In response to changes in the Indian economy, in 
1966 the Shiv Sena emerged with a simple agenda of reserving jobs and new economic 
opportunities for Maharashtrians. Migrants from other regions to Maharashtra, 
particularly South Indians, were attributed as the reasons for lack of employment for 
“natives,” and over time the Shiv Sena’s mission became explicitly a regional identity 
project, seeking to have a powerful Marathi-speaking empire. Under the leadership of Bal 
Thackeray and based in Bombay, the Shiv Sena took a strong populist stance against the 
“gangsterdom” that capitalism had created and as a result created a powerful and loyal 
following among middle class white collar workers. Interestingly, the Shiv Sena were 
also intensely anti-communist and later anti-Muslim; they used this rhetoric against any 
																																																								
60 Lele, 1995 
 42 
public party or politician that criticized or disagreed with Thackeray. With Chavan 
having established a strong Maratha sentiment in the state, the Shiv Sena – although not 
very politically active in the 1970s – were able to take firm root ideologically, including 
in Marathwada. 
India faced an acute recession from 1965-70 – the country faced “dramatic price 
increases, raw material shortage, low demand and slow national growth” and saw several 
workers strikes, public protests and occasional instances of violence.61  The Shiv Sena 
diverted attention from the recession’s socioeconomic fallout on the people and instead 
scapegoated the South Indians who had moved to Maharashtra; this fuelled the 
“speculative, ruthless and crime-linked casino capitalism” instead. This was an apparent 
reversal of the Shiv Sena’s initial public stance against unchecked capitalism. Their 
political volatility carried forward for many years to come. Like almost all parties in 
Maharashtra and India, the Shiv Sena “made it clear that, under conditions of pluralistic 
competition, they [would] exploit electoral politics to secure their own support base.”62 
They had a complicated relationship with not just the Dalit Panthers but dalit 
constituencies and communities in Maharashtra as a whole, until they conclusively 
adopted far-right Hindutva politics in the late 1980s. 
Through all of these movements and changes in political leadership, one thing 
that was common to the Marathwada region was the lack of any serious development 
initiatives within it specifically. The Nizam of Hyderabad was not at all interested in 
making any changes to the area, and it is from then onwards that Marathwada has 
suffered “stagnation of every kind; acceptance of existing reality has been the habit of the 																																																								
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people.”63 The people of Marathwada did, however, wage the liberation struggle against 
the Nizam (alongside government forces) to have the region join the rest of Maharashtra. 
They later petitioned the government of Maharashtra to address their socioeconomic 
grievances. Y. B. Chavan, made several Five-Year Plans that consistently failed to 
deliver – only 6% of funds were allocated to the region, and after a while they were 
simply written off.64 The failures of the Shiv Sena in bringing equal development to 
Maharashtra were written off xenophobically as the fault of outsiders. This constant 
neglect of Marathwada continued well into the 1970s, and left people feeling angry and 
frustrated; they were looking for an outlet to unleash their pent up resentments since their 
efforts to demand change were in vain. The renaming issue provided the perfect 
scapegoat; it gave the underdevelopment issue something to go on with.65 This was by no 
means as physically repressive as the violence in the rural parts of Marathwada, but at its 
core the frustrations were the same. 
The needs and demands of the people for increased socioeconomic development 
to the region fell on deaf ears; even if development was not possible because of the 
political gridlock of India, there was no one to listen to the people or provide redress to 
their many grievances. As a result, unemployment rates continued to skyrocket, prices for 
goods, supplies or services increased steadily and there were fewer and fewer educational 
opportunities for students. The irrefutable basis of most of India’s problems – today and 
historically – is that of inequality, injustice and exploitation.66 While development and 
economic growth can certainly bring some desired changes to a state as a whole, the 																																																								
63 Damle, 1994 
64 Datye, 1987 
65 Ibid.  
66 Damle, 1994 
 44 
process itself is inherently asymmetrical and “tardy,” and as such, will never benefit all 
sections of people equally. In other words, the rich got richer and the poor were left to 
dry. This was the magic of capitalism that still pervades global consciousness today. 
The longstanding sentiments of neglect, the lack of substantial development, the 
limitations of existing political structures in addressing people’s grievances and 
elsewhere in Maharashtra the simmering of pro-Maratha sentiment by the Shiv Sena and 
other parties culminated into a movement of political assertion and regional identity. 
Among other things, it led to the creation of a “permanent pressure group” called the 
Marathwada Janata Vikas Parishad (JVP) that worked to address problems of economic 
development without becoming a political party itself.67 Led in the late 1970s by 
Govindbhai Shroff, the work of the JVP began to have some visible effects after 1980 
with the government’s introduction of small-scale development programs. The riots did 
provide a small opportunity to strengthen the case for bringing development to 
Marathwada when the JVP and Anantrao Bhalerao submitted numerous forms to the 
government petitioning for increased irrigation, manufacture plans, agricultural 
production and service sector industries as a direct way to mitigate class/caste 
antagonisms. One MP (Member of Parliament) even introduced a bill to establish a 
separate board for the development of ‘backward’ regions in Maharashtra.68 Still, for 
years to come, there was little that changed tangibly, and Marathwada still lacked 
significant – or any – political clout.  
It is important, then, to pose these questions: what did the people of Marathwada 
mean when they asked for “development”? More jobs? More disposable income? 																																																								
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Improved standards of living? More access to education? These are modest aspirations, 
but they invite their own set of fundamental questions: Did these demands to the 
government include increased opportunities to the dalits as well? Would it have changed 
the nature of caste relations that were seemingly so fragile? Would it have solved the 
‘problem’ of reservations that had sparked so much controversy and antagonism in the 
rural middle class? 
 
“Socially Unjust” Reservations?  
In the days of the urban agitations, even schoolchildren from some morchas were 
shouting “Down with concessions! Stop reservations!” It was these slogans that brought 
all the non-dalits onto the streets, and the resounding “Marathwada Murdabad!” coming 
from the dalit counter-protests that made the non-dalits violent. More than half the 
students at the University got concessions and affirmative action-type protections under 
the Scheduled Castes legal scheme. The prevailing belief among caste Hindus was fairly 
simplistic: the dalits had benefited for years from the many affirmative action policies of 
the government. Almost any dalit that wanted to get into a university or school could, 
most government jobs were required to reserve 34% of their positions for dalit workers, 
and the state subsidized almost every additional expense that dalit families incurred. 
Against a difficult socioeconomic landscape and the severe lack of opportunities in 
underdeveloped regions like Marathwada, being dalit seemed like the dream, one that 
dalits did not deserve. If one were to look at it through the lens of a disillusioned twenty-
something unable to make ends meet or pursue any personal goals, this view of 
affirmative action might be understandable, if only to evoke sympathy. However, this is 
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too reductionist a portrayal of something that is quite complex, and is blatantly discarding 
a deep history of caste oppression that continues to produce draconian material realities 
for millions of dalits today. 
The dalits as a whole are – by virtue of their status in Hindu society – on the 
lowest rungs of the caste ladder. Not only do they face daily discrimination, vis-à-vis 
education, health, and employment, among many other social sectors, but they are also 
often subjected to acts of vicious direct violence. A 2010 report by the National Human 
Rights Commission (NHRC) provided the following evidence that illuminates the extent 
and intensity of the ‘dalit condition’ in contemporary India:  
A crime is committed against a Dalit every 18 minutes. Every day, on average, 
three Dalit women are raped, two Dalits murdered, and two Dalit houses burnt. 37 
per cent of Dalits live below the poverty line. 54 per cent are undernourished. 83 
out of every 1,000 children born in a Dalit household die before their first 
birthday and 12 per cent before their fifth birthday. 45 per cent remain illiterate. 
The data also shows that Dalits are prevented from entering the police station [to 
lodge complaints and report atrocities] in 28 per cent of Indian villages. Dalit 
children have been made to sit separately while eating in 39 per cent government 
schools. Dalits do not get mail delivered to their homes in 24 per cent of villages. 
And they are denied access to water sources in 48 per cent of our villages because 
untouchability remains a stark reality even though it was abolished in 1955.69 
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In 1977, 70% of India’s entire dalit population was living in poverty (compared to 
the 56% national statistic, which too was inflated because it included the dalits). The 
standard measure of poverty was whether a person had an income sufficient enough to 
consume a base number of food calories per day – 2400 for rural inhabitants and 2100 for 
urban.70 This is not a comprehensive and holistic measure of living conditions, which 
ought to include overall nutrition, health, housing, general consumption and education. 
But even in studies that account for all of these categories, dalits were the overwhelming 
majority. Dalit poverty stemmed primarily from the relationship of dalits to agriculture 
and land, which will be analyzed later. Given this context of dalit subjugation, the many 
affirmative actions schemes implemented in Ambedkar’s Constitution are warranted and 
in fact incredibly necessary and long overdue. But the violence still faced by dalits, as 
exemplified in the riots, exhibits how despite legal successes in establishing protections 
and some reparations for the nearly 200 million dalits in India, social reforms in attitudes 
and actions of the Indian population have barely taken place. The reservation system also 
does little to address the endogamy, patrimony and other social “traditions” that continue 
to oppress millions of people. The legal rhetoric on caste in post-independence India has 
become a rallying point for opportunistic politicians to capitalize on vote banks, 
acknowledging the power of caste in mobilizing the masses. “It is not politics that gets 
caste-ridden; it is caste that gets politicized.” 
There were many reactions to the renaming vis-à-vis the reservation issue, some 
more legitimate than others. To the religiously inclined or otherwise pro-Hindu/pro-																																																								
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Brahmin students, the renaming was a slap in the face; it seemed blasphemous and 
disrespectful for the “ashuddhs” (impure, untouchables) to challenge the authority of their 
superiors. To the general masses, it was a matter of “equality” and “fairness” – why 
should a dalit student who had gotten 40% in an exam get an essentially free seat at a 
prestigious university whereas a caste Hindu that slogged to earn a 90% was left without 
a higher education? On the one hand, these were valid questions, and legitimate 
frustrations. The Indian education system at the time was in dire need of logistical reform 
in their allocation of seats and delineation of grade requirements, and in regions like 
Marathwada, in need of more/bigger universities. But on the other hand – as is the case in 
many countries that have to tackle with “affirmative action backlash” – the targeted 
blaming of dalits for these problems was not always evidenced with well-researched 
criticisms. They were often baseless assumptions or rumours that were stubbornly buried 
under layers of self-serving falsehoods that were naturally more easily digestible. 
However, unlike in other parts of the world where affirmative action usually has to do 
with relatively clear-cut issues like class, race, or gender, the caste dimension in India 
makes the line between who is “deserving” and who is not murky. 
The most logical case against these “socially unjust” reservations was presented by 
the well-informed leaders of caste Hindu student groups. The argument was not simply that 
dalits did not deserve them by nature of their social status as dalits, or even that their 
educational merits were insufficient – but rather that there was a significant population of 
well-to-do dalits who earned far more than any other group of EBCs, OBCs or other classes 
of impoverished people, but still availed themselves of the economic concessions and 
reservations they did not really need financially. The income limit to qualify was Rs. 1,200 
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per annum in the mid-1960s to around Rs. 4,800 by the 1980s. Today, this limit is an 
astonishing Rs. 600,000 per year. In Marathwada as well as in most universities in India, 
there was widespread corruption in acquiring these income certificates. A handful of rich 
dalits, as well as a number of rich upper-caste children, benefited from the OBC reservations 
by forging income certificates. While the issue brought up by the rioters is quite pertinent, a 
more comprehensive way to reform the quota system is needed. More importantly, the 
question to be asked is whether the number of people that cheat the system – dalit or not – 
are significantly higher than those who benefit from it, and if it is a fair trade off.  
Given the overwhelming statistics, the answer to this question is a resounding no. 
Even with quotas, 25.5% of upper castes held 69% of all government jobs and 90% of all 
Class I jobs in Maharashtra, when they comprised only about a third of the state’s 
population.71 The vast majority of dalits had few assets to their name and even fewer 
resources with which to challenge their subjugation. Faced with a hostile state apparatus 
rather than a sympathetic welfare state, the Indian poor – which mainly comprised dalits 
– had no discretionary power to do anything, let alone join the increasing trends of 
consumption, largely because of the occupational immobility of the caste system. The 
only way out of their traditional occupation or bonded agricultural labour was to join the 
government through a reservation or quota, which, contrary to popular belief, was only 
available to a small number of dalits – namely the Mahars. All of the relatively high-
ranking government jobs open to the dalit quota – the only ones that gave dalits the 
opportunity to propel their families to a higher economic status – were taken up almost 																																																								
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entirely by the Mahars. History had tipped slightly in their favour, and the reaction was 
savage. 
For the rest of the dalits, job quotas merely meant exchanging one form of misery 
for another. The addition of educational quotas helped the overall situation some more, 
although not nearly enough. Literacy “bestows confidence and expands mental horizons, 
which can lead to a more assertive, less compliant community.”72 The dalits – Mahars 
and others alike – that were able to enroll in schools and colleges were educated in more 
ways than one. Some were able to develop skill sets that allowed them to get jobs outside 
of their traditional occupations without the help of the quotas, while others, particularly 
women, were educated on reproductive health, domestic abuse, and feminism, allowing 
them to exercise their agency.  
While it is true that there are many people, both within the dalit community and 
outside of it, that take advantage of the system meant to repair old wounds and reverse 
millennia of oppression, there is unlikely to be a way to measure “how much oppression” 
someone has gone through in order to be eligible. Even in the case of those dalits who are 
financially better off than other scheduled castes, socioeconomic success is not always 
equivalent to caste liberation.  The system of reservations and quotas – despite being 
around for many decades – is itself only illusory in its protection of dalits. As is 
exemplified by the Marathwada riots, the government does little to truly understand the 
needs of its most vulnerable people. It also does not explain the system and the reasons 
for its existence to the students who violently protest it – the history taught in classrooms 
is largely and horribly inadequate. Or perhaps intentionally so.  
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Regardless, the non-dalits that participated in the urban agitations were not all 
upper-caste Hindus nor were they all from higher classes. Many of them came from 
middle peasant castes and came from equally if not poorer backgrounds than the dalits 
who attended the University through the quota system. There was naturally resentment 
there, one that is worth paying attention to. Another common argument against the 
system of reservations was that of all seats in a college or all positions in a workplace, 
34% of them were required to be given to scheduled castes and tribes. According to then-
recently added directive, any unfulfilled quota carried forward to the next year, as a way 
to compensate for any backlog. Because this provision was not added until the 1970s, 
there was confusion about its implications. In theory, this could mean that it was possible 
to have a dalit quota reach 100%. This sparked outrage and fear of its own kind. 
However, the directive also mentioned that the backlog at any point cannot exceed 50%. 
In general, all of the reservation schemes were to be implemented empirically 
“accounting for local sentiment,”73 but it was unclear who made those decisions and on 
whose discretion they could be carried out. In 1974 in Maharashtra, 34% of all police 
patils were supposed to be dalit. However, due to the Maratha preserves and strongholds, 
that did not happen and all the policemen were caste Hindus. Until the riots in 1978, this 
did not pose a problem. The riots brought back to stage the issue of reservations that had 
left mainstream political discourse for a while. In 1980, the issue was to be reopened in 
Parliament, the “battle lines” for which were being drawn in Marathwada.   
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Changes in the Agrarian Landscape 
In the rural sector, the underlying structures that fueled the Marathwada riots were 
very distinct. Underdevelopment, sub-regionalism and even the quota system were 
prominent even in the villages, but what was unique was how the violence worked its 
way into the prevailing structures of agricultural labour, sugar and cotton co-operatives 
and land cultivation, ownership and reallocation. The levels of poverty faced by dalits 
historically and contemporarily come from their relationship with agricultural land. In 
general, the dalits are an “agrarian people without strong land assets.”74 In the late 1970s, 
81% of the dalit population lived rurally, against the 74% Indian average (which included 
dalits). Agriculture comprises the primary sector of the Indian economy; therefore the 
rural landscape of the country was characterized by the agricultural industry. About 50% 
of dalits in India were agricultural labourers and another 25% were cultivators and 
sharecroppers75. It is worth nothing that not all landless persons were necessarily poor 
(many Brahmins served as priests in temples instead of owning farmland, and were 
immensely wealthy) and not all poverty in India was rural (migration flows to the urban 
sphere and other politico-economic factors resulted in a significant population of urban 
poor). The rural poor and working peasantry of India faced several hardships, but the 
dalits in particular faced a distinct, historical form of violence that manifested in the rural 
agrarian economy. Marathwada, to this day, experiences among the highest rates of 
farmer suicide, starvation and poverty.  
The population of poor dalits in Maharashtra was 66% in 1971, which was high 
for an otherwise prosperous state. Most of these poor dalits lived rurally. A significant 																																																								
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driver of agrarian conflict in the state was the sharp socioeconomic divide among the 
rural population, especially in Marathwada. On the one hand were rich zamindars 
(landowners) that typically owned 200-300 acres of land.  On the other were the dalits 
and poor peasants, who were mostly landless labourers. Those that did possess land had 
small holdings (1-2 acres) of usually uncultivable land.76 These small holdings comprised 
around 24% of all landholdings in Marathwada. Unlike other parts of Maharashtra, in 
Marathwada 31.6% of rural households owned 77.5% of the region’s land in holdings of 
10 acres or more. In other words, a small group of wealthy regional elites – the zamindars 
– owned three quarters of all available land, whereas the remaining quarter was divided 
into small plots of land to be owned by a number of dalits.  
This land came to be owned by dalits generally in one of three ways: “(1) Mahar 
watan lands77, (2) individual purchase, or (3) ‘land for the landless’ government 
schemes.”78 The watan lands at first seemed like a viable solution to historical 
landlessness. However the conditions and hours under which the dalits, prominently 
Mahars, worked were nothing short of slave labour, an issue tackled at length later. 
Ambedkar successfully organized several agitations against the Mahar Watan proposal, 
asserting that the result of such schemes was that the Mahars “lost self-respect, their 
ambition and their abilities [became] tied down to their trifling menial jobs,” and as a 
community they were enslaved and deteriorated.79 Instead, Ambedkar advocated for 
thorough land reforms and emphasized that the value of an agricultural holding could not 																																																								
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be determined solely by its physical area but also by the quality of the land, its capacity to 
be cultivated and the availability of other agricultural inputs including irrigation and 
labour. The right to own and control land was a crucial demand in the dalit struggle 
because it elevated dignity, social status and autonomy for its holders as well as made 
available economic opportunities that landlessness had fervently prevented. The unequal 
distribution and ownership of land formed a primary obstacle to broad-based rural 
development, in Marathwada as much as in the rest of India.  
During the 1940s and the 1950s, there was a strong agrarian struggle against the 
dominance of landowners. But within this struggle were two distinct movements: that of 
the kisans (the shudra peasants) and that of the mazdurs (dalit field servants). The kisans’ 
fight was an anti-zamindar struggle, fighting for the abolition of landlordism in all its 
forms, affecting dalits only nominally. The mazdur struggle, on the other hand, was more 
“revolutionary” because of their specific and additional goals, which included fighting 
the vethbegar – “feudal forced labour” – and the distinct menial and degrading caste 
duties of dalits. This struggle only peripherally affected the kisans, whose demands were 
satisfied by the abolition of zamindari.80 Many parts of Marathwada followed the British-
created ryotwari system, which, unlike the zamindari system, meant the taxes and 
revenues on the land was collected directly from the cultivators of the land. While 
workers in ryotwari areas were not slave to their zamindar’s discretion, they were often in 
huge amounts of debt to money-lenders. The elimination of landlordism did not solve the 
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problems of the ryots, and so equivalent demands had to be made in the mazdur 
movements for the freedom from debt and oppressive taxation. 
There were many compelling economic and political arguments for land reform, 
from the kisans as well as the mazdurs, and in the years after Independence it had been a 
nationally-mandated priority of state governments. The land reforms that Ambedkar 
proposed included the redistribution of land and land rights from big landholders to the 
rural poor, ones that provided the latter with more “equitable and secure access” to land.81 
This invariably implied a degree of confiscation from landowners, who were bound to 
lose a number of their privileges; land reform therefore was a deeply political process. 
Ambedkar’s memorandum proposed “state ownership in agriculture with a collectivized 
method of cultivation.”82 In other words, land would belong to the state and could be let 
out to villagers regardless of caste or creed; after the abolition of landlordism the 
“natural” alternative should be collective or co-operative farming. However, the rise of 
capitalist farming and development techniques proved as much a barrier to this vision of 
unity as the deep underpinnings of caste did. Nonetheless, a number of tenancy and land-
ceiling laws were enacted from the 1950s onwards. Small plots of land were to be given 
to dalits to own and cultivate themselves, including leftover or waste lands of the 
government. Often these plots were too small or too far from the village to be properly 
cultivated by the dalits and as a result were often swallowed by rich farmers, rendering 
the reform schemes useless. The issue of land ownership was a historical sore, one that 
had been festering for decades. Starting in 1974, the issue returned to the forefront of life 
in Marathwada. 																																																								
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Four years before the Marathwada riots of 1978, a land-ceiling law was passed 
that allowed farmers to hold only 18 acres of irrigated land, or 27 acres of land that has 
no assured perennial supply of irrigation water for more than one crop.83 Any lands in 
excess to these limits would be redistributed; at least 60%84 of this surplus was to be 
given to the dalit mazdurs. Even though the implementation of this law was staggered 
and uneven across Maharashtra, it came as a shock to the landed elites of the region. It 
gave economic agency to the landless agricultural workers, the majority of whom were 
dalits. The relationship between land ownership and agricultural waged labour, set 
against the background of capitalist development, is pivotal in understanding the nature 
of the agitations in 1978.  
 
Agricultural Labour in the Era of Capitalism 
 Over three quarters of the dalit population in Maharashtra worked in the 
agricultural sector. According to the 1971 Census, there were 6.5 million cultivators 
(including owner-cultivators, tenants and sharecroppers; these categories overlapped) and 
5.4 million agricultural labourers. For every 100 cultivators, there were 82 agricultural 
labourers. The proportion of agricultural labourers in the total worker population was 
29.8% in Maharashtra, against the 25.8% proportion in the country. In 1961, these figures 
were 23.8% and 16.7% respectively. The increase in 10 years demonstrated that surplus 
manpower was not being siphoned away from agriculture to other sectors of the economy 
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– although dalit movements after 1972 encouraged it – but that dependence on agriculture 
and agricultural labour had actually increased.85 Notably only 4% of all the land in 
Marathwada was easily cultivatable in the decade or so after Independence; the region’s 
backwardness caused it to have few irrigation facilities, frequent drought and floods 
made most of the land infertile.86 
Agricultural labourers were hired either as ‘casual’ or ‘attached’ labour. Casual 
labour implied a seasonal contract and hours as needed by the landowners. Attached 
labour, a far more common practice, was a system where workers were hired on a yearly 
basis and worked 10-16 hours a day, usually without a weekly holiday, in exchange for 
food and shelter. What propelled most agricultural labourers to concede to attached 
labour was the immense indebtedness they accumulated as a result of political, economic 
and environmental factors. When agricultural labourers were hired as attached labour by 
way of debt repayment, landed employers rarely supplied them with working conditions 
above the bare minimum level of sustenance required; they had to recover the loan 
amount with interest. This was in itself a form of bonded labour, but the ‘dalit condition’ 
made it an “option” many dalits preferred, since it was – in a sense – a year-long job 
guarantee.87  
In general, agricultural labourers were heavily dependent on wage employment. 
Marathwada had the lowest wage rates of any region in Maharashtra, and consequently 
the lowest income. The minimum agricultural wage in Nanded in 1978 was Rs. 3. Dalits 
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who worked on the fields in the homes of village chiefs were paid between Rs. 3 and Rs. 
3.5. In drier parts of the region, landless labour was paid Rs. 1.25 to Rs. 1.5.88 The 
average income from agricultural wages was Rs. 260 annually (Rs. 30 from non-
agricultural industries, Rs. 26 from land yield, and Rs. 9 from other sources) and the 
average overall income was Rs. 353. According to the Report on Economic Conditions of 
Weaker Sections of the Rural Population of Maharashtra in 1970-71, the total wage 
income was Rs. 1,253 annually and the average expenditure was Rs. 1,417. The average 
amount in outstanding loans per wage earner in rural areas across the state was Rs. 57. 
Most of these loans were taken out for normal maintenance, seed and agricultural input in 
cases of landed labourers, and ceremonies. During off-seasons, the “near-subsistence 
level” wage was insufficient to cover the consumption needs and expenses of agricultural 
labourer families, who resorted to taking loans from money-lenders or pledging their 
labour at even lower rates for the next season.89 
The Page Committee that published the Report made recommendations to the 
Maharashtrian government to implement laws requiring labourers to avail fewer working 
hours, a fixed and generous number of paid holidays, and a strict minimum wage 
(calculated by converting the amount of staple grain needed into a cash figure; as 
mentioned earlier, poverty in India is assessed by the minimum amount of calorie intake 
required by a person for sustenance). Unsurprisingly, the state and national governments 
did little to seriously put these recommendations into action. Even the opposition parties 
did not put pressure on their rivals in power on this issue. In all likelihood, even if the 
government were to have passed a fixed, reasonable minimum wage, it would have 																																																								
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stayed on paper unless the agricultural workers were politically organized. The political 
organization of dalits in Maharashtra has a vibrant history as a result of Ambedkar and 
his politics, but in Marathwada most dalit movements relating to land and labour were 
successfully suppressed. When the new tenancy laws were enacted in the mid 1950s, 
most small tenants and landless dalits were “terrorized” by the landlords into 
“voluntarily” surrendering their newly-acquired tenancies. In fact, estimates from fact-
finding committees reveal that only a third of all tenancy cases in the state resulted in the 
tenant successfully getting a part or all of the land leased to them. In Marathwada, the 
percentage was around 13%.90 The argument was that landless labourers could have 
made full avail of these opportunities had there been strong political organization among 
them.  
To be sure, there were many political struggles and movements waged against the 
government. The kisans and the mazdurs, for instance, put significant pressure on the 
state to make changes towards easing the plight of the rural poor, even if just on paper. 
The issue was being politically organized against regional upper caste and elitist interests, 
enough to bring about an attitudinal and sociocultural shift at best, or at the very least 
gain enough political leverage to ensure safety and survival. The political climate of 
Maharashtra through the 1970s was complex and multifaceted; it was not easy to 
delineate what the “upper caste and elitist interests” were, especially since they were 
intertwined with the power structures of political party interests. In fact, the intensity of 
the sociopolitical hegemony of these “interests” was manifested in the deep regional 
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disparity in agricultural development of rural areas, and particularly in the emergence of 
sugarcane and cotton co-operatives.   
Marathwada had been an economically backward region for decades, in large 
measure as a result of the oppressive social structures and neglect of the Nizam. The 
ryotwari land tenures in the rural parts of the region had the potential for “the growth of 
enterprise” and “generated incentives for work,” particularly through sugarcane and 
cotton cultivation by kisans, but the negligence of the Nizam stifled any form of 
agricultural development.91  Importantly, the Nizam’s regime was Muslim in a 
predominantly Maratha region; the Maratha elites felt oppressed by his theocratic 
politics. These sentiments (along with colonial “divide and rule” politics) set the stage for 
both the rising tide of Hindu nationalism as well as the strong sub-regional identity that 
emerged in Marathwada in the latter half of twentieth century, upon which parties like the 
Shiv Sena lobbied and rose to power. Unlike the rest of Maharashtra, Marathwada did not 
“enjoy the contingencies of democracy and capitalist modernization [that came with] 
British colonial rule, rather it had to continue with the framework of a community based 
on caste and religion.”92  
Elsewhere in Maharashtra, capitalism had penetrated into rural life and the 
development of agro-industries and co-operatives led to increasing prosperity for a 
section of farmers in irrigated areas. Massive irrigation schemes and long-term 
development plans were initiated, particularly in the Sahyadri Mountain (Western Ghats) 
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valleys where eastward-flowing rivers could be used for hydroelectric power.93 Many of 
these dam-building projects resulted in the displacement of large communities and 
widespread corruption and electoral politics in affected areas, but were deemed 
“successful” since overall state-wide irrigation had improved. The irrigation schemes and 
the creation of massively state-sponsored cooperative credit institutions laid the economic 
basis for a “rich-peasant cash crop economy,” and later the Green Revolution in some 
parts of the state. The state also actively pushed for setting up agro-industries, mostly 
sugar co-operative factories, for which they improved transport and communication. All 
of these changes – including the strong Maratha presence, land reform laws, and even the 
spread of education in rural areas – essentially facilitated a transfer of power from urban 
to rural spheres of life in Maharashtra. This meant the “emergence of firm political bases 
and centers of power in the rural areas, [creating] a solid phalanx of district level 
leadership for the Congress.”94  
 This shift of power and the uneven capitalist development of Maharashtra 
resulted in a number of concurrent processes. Y.B Chavan consolidated his position in 
rural Maharashtra, using a “mix of factionalism and pragmatism, bordering on 
opportunism” to establish his credibility among the national Congress leadership. As 
Chief Minister from 1956 onwards, he “built bridges” with the urban, industrial and 
trading interests in Bombay and elsewhere, becoming a symbol of rural Maratha power in 
the minds of the common people.95 Since Maharashtra had no indigenous trading or 
entrepreneurial class of its own, most businesses were owned by migrants from other 
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parts of India. The urban trading interests were, therefore, in the hands of non-
Maharashtrians and Chavan’s alliance with them was perceived more as a sign of 
dominance rather than co-operation. Nonetheless, the urban industrial sector of Bombay 
boomed under capitalist development initiatives in the state. Oil refineries and 
engineering industries rose as did the population of the city (from 1.5 million in 1941 to 6 
million in 1971). Capital, labour and trade “converged and crowded into Bombay” and its 
ever-expanding suburbs, inevitably making it an immensely crowded conglomerate with 
worsening work and living conditions.96 This unchecked development and haphazard 
growth formed part of the reason for the resentment against Bombay and Western 
Maharashtra by Marathwada elites. But more importantly, the rapid growth of factories 
and industrial sectors had led to the unionization of wage-workers and salaried 
employees. Bombay had become the stronghold of the Left, particularly of the 
communists. But after the center of power shifted to rural bases, the ruling Congress 
party succeeded in dismantling and disuniting large populations from their leftist militant 
organizations, making the Left politically fragmented in Bombay.97 
 
Sugar Kings and their Irrigated Kingdoms 
Many “islands of rural capitalism” emerged through the 1960s and 70s, central to 
which were the co-operative sugar factories and co-operative banks. In the early 1970s, 
there were 39 sugar co-ops in Maharashtra, of which 34 were in Western Maharashtra, 2 
in Vidarbha and 3 in Marathwada. The total membership of the co-ops was around 
130,000. In the 1972-73 season, 37 sugar co-ops produced 8.5 tonnes of sugar. Given the 																																																								
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average price levels of sugar in the year, the sugar co-ops were estimated to have a gross 
turnover of around two billion rupees.98 The vast amount of profits generated from these 
co-ops made them the mainstay for political power. Elections to their board of directors 
happened yearly and were, unsurprisingly, trials of political strength that matched the 
intensity of government elections. Various leaders sent a “panel” to represent them, who 
were in turn voted to service specific sugarcane producing villages and factories. In the 
Congress years, the central political figures leading the co-ops included Vasantdada Patil, 
Y.B. Chavan, V.P Naik and Sharad Pawar.  
Needless to say, the sugar co-ops play an important role in the Congress party 
politics of Maharashtra. They are a major source of funding for the party; the government 
frequently manipulates sugar prices or relaxes restrictions in order to increase the profits 
generated, even marginally. The sugar co-ops dominate the rural economy; several 
farmers made small fortunes by joining them, since they paid full price for sugarcane and 
arranged for crop loans. Those who controlled sugar co-ops also controlled local 
panchayati raj institutions in the emerging capitalist political order. The sugar co-ops 
soon diversified their activities into manufacturing liquor. Under pressure from the co-
ops, the government scrapped prohibition laws and in fact dramatically lowered sales tax 
on liquor, expanding the profit margin of the sugar co-ops immensely. Widespread 
corruption and vote bank politics among the avaricious government ensured their sway 
over other sectors of life would remain strong and the benefits of the co-ops would be 
limited to only those in power. The chokehold of sugar co-ops in Maharashtra point to the 																																																								
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extent of capitalist political hegemony that shaped the region and their sheer dominance 
over life in rural areas. The discrepancy between Western Maharashtra and the rest of the 
state is clearer. Most importantly, it gives an idea of the weight of what the dalits and 
other agricultural labourers demanding for higher wages were up against. It seemed futile 
for any opposition party, particularly a Leftist party, to challenge Congress control over 
sugar co-ops, or the influence of the co-ops over the local economy and politics. But it is 
important to note that the benefits of the most prosperous co-op was still limited only to a 
small section of the rural elite, and if co-op workers – the proletariat – could be organized 
against bourgeois interests, the system could tumble. 
There were other implications of Congress leaders dominating the co-ops, on rural 
development as well as on maintaining effective state machinery. The competition for co-
op control provided the grounds for factional politics within the ruling party. Vasantdada 
Patil campaigned ferociously for control of the sugar co-ops in order to block S. B 
Chavan’s appointment as Chief Minister. Chavan, in turn, used his position as Chief 
Minister to keep the sugar co-ops at bay while he promised to tackle the droughts hitting 
the countryside in order to secure his reelection. The unchecked pressure on sugar co-ops 
for production led inevitably to massive droughts in the region. These droughts were a 
“man-made calamity consequent on the skewed pattern of irrigation in favour of certain 
areas and crops, notably Western Maharashtra and sugarcane.”99 Sugarcane cultivation 
consumes ten times as much water as required by coarse grain cultivation. As a result, all 
available water was used for sugarcane. Food grain production – particularly coarse 																																																								
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cereals, the staple of rural and urban poor – consequently did not receive any irrigation 
and therefore did not do well over the years; it was “always the first victim of fluctuating 
rainfall.”100 Irrigation is a political issue linked to the interests of the powerful sugar co-
ops. The government’s irrigation schemes ensured a perennial supply of water to all of 
the state’s sugar co-ops. Even with severe droughts that hit the region, there was rarely a 
danger of the water supply being interrupted. In the 1980s, the state government’s annual 
expenditure on maintenance of irrigation projects was around Rs. 300 million, half of 
which was expected to be recovered by way of irrigation water charges. However, the 
government rarely made back that money and their dues have risen by over 500 million 
in the years between 1976-1986. The sharp increase in dues is because of fines levied on 
the “large scale pilferage of water from canals, use of water for unsanctioned cash crops, 
and for drawing more than sanctioned water by paying bribes to officials.”101 This is 
indicative of the immense corruption and underhanded dealings characteristic of any 
political profit endeavour in India. The dues existed for all practical purposes only on 
paper and no real efforts were made to recover them; the leaders in power were the ones 
responsible for them in the first place.  
No political leader had challenged the irrigation policy that tipped steeply in 
favour of the sugar barons. In 1986, SB Chavan made the first attempt by trying to 
provide irrigation to the dry lands, like those in Marathwada, for at least 8 months a year, 
but he received little support. The percentage of irrigated area to net sown area in 
Marathwada was 5.14% in 1970, 9.21% in 1980 and then 14-15% from 1990 onwards. In 																																																								
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Western Maharashtra, the percentage increased from 10% to around 29% in the same 
time period.102 Even though there is a steady increase in the percentage of irrigated areas 
of Marathwada, the gap between Marathwada and Western Maharashtra remains almost 
the same through the decades. The irrigated areas of Maharashtra unsurprisingly 
constitute the ‘sugar belt’ and are the base for political hegemony in the state; 
development can only be equitable when this hegemony is broken, for instance by a 
Chief Minister reallocating irrigation projects, but since most Chief Ministers were 
central to the sugar lobby, the state was faced with a political impasse.  
The situation was similar for cotton co-ops although the lobby was not as strong. 
Most of the sugarcane-producing factories also had set up units for cotton and tobacco 
cultivation. In the 1970s, Marathwada had a 27% share of the gross cropped area, its 
main crop being cotton. The village of Nanded had the largest cotton plantations and co-
operative factories, including the Usmanshahi Mill, the only large cotton mill in all of 
Marathwada. In 1974, the Cotton Monopoly Purchase Scheme (CMPS) was implemented 
with the stated aims of preventing cotton cultivators and sharecroppers from exploitation. 
What it did was essentially prevent private operators, traders and co-operatives from 
procuring cotton directly from producers; they had to obtain licenses and broker the deal 
through the government, which determined the prices of cotton and charged its own 
commissions.103 The CMPS was not implemented in its full capacity until S.B Chavan, an 
adversary of sugar and cotton lobbies, became Chief Minister. The scheme undermined 																																																								
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trading and entrepreneurial interests and bred a great deal of anger among the dominant 
cotton traders.  
Additionally, the consequences of undeveloped irrigation also meant the lack of 
flood control measures in areas like Nanded, which was prone to heavy floods. The 
severe flood and rain of 1969 destroyed the kharif cotton crops (summer/rain variety), 
and it was too late to plant other rabi (spring) crops as recommended.104 The rich farmers 
who were members of various co-operative banks and federations demanded reparations 
for damage to their crops because of the severe weather, instead of repaying loans they 
owed to the government. In turn Congress explained these away for years as simply the 
“mounting arrears of successive droughts.”105 Powerful lobbies downplayed both kharif 
and rabi grains, forestalling any move by the state to impose tax on the production of or 
the acreage under unsanctioned cash crops for which the farmers were demanding 
reparations.  
Floods were a frequent occurrence in over 96 villages in Marathwada, and as a 
result the need for grain relief was immense, especially because almost a third of 
Marathwada’s population comprised agricultural labourers without land of their own. The 
floods of Nanded affected both landowners and landless labourers, but the latter were 
largely left out of damage analyses and reparations. With the cotton crop washed away, 
poor peasants and dalit labourers were out of work and thus had to borrow money to buy 
grain, which only increased their debt. With proper irrigation, enough jowar could have 																																																								
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been produced for the entire state and the damage from floods could have been 
significantly mitigated.106 In fertile seasons, the cotton trade of Nanded flourished under 
the baronage of rich rural elites. In fact, a number of farmer movements erupted in the 
1970s to protect rich farmer interests by demanding higher prices for crops like onion, 
sugarcane and cotton. In the late 1970s, the sugar lobby succeeded in imposing higher 
prices for cane, jowar, rice and other crops. Sharad Joshi, painted as a leader of the 
peasant movement, began his career with a campaign on onion prices. He asserted that 
poor farmers in dry areas had to unite against the rich farmers in irrigated areas. He was 
quickly won over by Congress (I), and a number of parties, including the “politically 
motivated” opposition had a part to play. The movement was quickly adapted to 
sugarcane. According to the 1971 census, 83% of all sugarcane in Maharashtra is grown 
on farms bigger than 5 acres, and given the resources required for cane cultivation, it can 
be assumed that most of these farmers were rich, capitalist farmers. The “Cane Farmers 
Movement” was therefore “not just a movement led by rich peasants but also a movement 
of the rich peasants.”107 It conflicted with the interests of the majority of rural poor 
families, including agricultural labourers and poor peasants dependent on wage labour, 
who required lower prices for food, higher wages for work and an end to caste atrocities. 
--- 
Overall, Marathwada was not able to achieve the level of development its regional 
counterparts enjoyed and was therefore unable to effectively compete for a share of the 																																																								
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state’s resources. Not only was this a result of the lack of an articulated structure of 
alliances and factions, but also because of the political dominance of elite interests in 
various agro-industries and the unchecked capitalist power of self-interested politicians in 
those lobbies. The politics of Maharashtra as a whole were an expression of the 
“hegemony of sugar barons and the big bourgeoisie of Bombay.”108 Vasantdada Patil, 
Y.B Chavan and Sharad Pawar all came from Western Maharashtra; no leader from the 
rest of the state has had nearly as much power and influence as they have had. S.B 
Chavan was one of the only leaders from Marathwada and along with VP Naik of 
Vidarbha, tried to push the interests of backward regions. All that came of it was his own 
downfall; the rich farmer movements backed by powerful lobbies were too strong to 
budge. Civil society organizations like the Janata Vikas Andolan in Marathwada – led by 
the Marathas – argued the case for more budgetary allocation vis-à-vis the issue of 
economic backwardness in the region, but the Congress party “strategically diluted this 
sub-regional protest by co-opting the dominant landowning Maratha elites who were 
mostly associated with Congress” anyway.109 Most of the struggles that dominated the 
politics of rural Maharashtra have been those over terms of trade (higher prices for crops, 
concessions for farm input, etc.) that were indicative of the capitalist nature of the rural 
economy, benefits of which had been reaped by big landowners who grew sugarcane and 
cotton. These were not struggles of the “peasant against the landlord,” but rather a 
manifestation of the conflict between the rural and industrial bourgeoisie, with no room 
for dalit voices to be heard. All over India in the 1970s, rallies with tens of thousands of 
people erupted to protest against giving land to the landless, blaming the economy for 																																																								
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their inability to give higher wages to their labourers and in the same breath complaining 
that the dalits were getting “lazier and more arrogant by the day.”110 
The agrarian landscape of Maharashtra is instrumental in contextualizing the 
violence against rural dalits in the 1978 Marathwada riots. The ‘political awakening’ of 
the Mahars against the uneven capitalist development of the state formed the basis for a 
shift in labour-landowner relations. The intensity of the riots was greatest in the three 
districts of Marathwada (eastern Aurangabad, Parbhani and Nanded) that had 
experienced the shift to cash crop production of sugarcane and HYV cotton.111 That along 
with increased irrigation facilities – albeit minimal compared to other parts of 
Maharashtra – had resulted in more agricultural work. The land tenure schemes, where 
successful, had given dalits small plots of land on which to cultivate their own cash 
crops, which followed the successes of the sugarcane and cotton market on a small scale. 
Those who continued to work as waged labourers saw an increase in agricultural wages 
across the board. After the recession of 1965-70, the prices of food grain began to drop 
and government subsidies enabled poor peasants and dalits to afford a reasonable ration 
of necessary staples. Government-created work and the capitalist expansion of industry, 
along with government quotas and concessions, gave dalits a huge opportunity to leave 
their jobs as forced labourers behind. Because of their increasing independence from the 
landed gentry, dalits’ support to political parties underwent changes. Where they first 
voted for whomever their landlords supported, they now voted against Congress and in 
favour of dalit parties like the RPI or the Dalit Panthers, or whichever party campaigned 
on the grounds of improving dalit lives in their hometowns. All of these changes gave 																																																								
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agricultural labourers greater bargaining power and agency, albeit not uniformly and 
consistently across Marathwada. Where for decades landless labour had been at the “beck 
and call” of the rich landowners, they now had to be sought after. This came as a 
“psychological shock” to the landowners, who saw in the renaming of Marathwada 
University “a reflection of their own situation.”112 The Mahars had become an 
independent and liberated class, on par with many suvarnas. The landed elites wanted the 
dalits, especially the Mahars, to return to their “traditional jobs” in fields and houses – in 
other words back to the practice of vethbegar. Attacks on Mahars were especially vicious 
in all areas of Marathwada, with the conspicuous exception of those areas where bonded 
labour was still practiced and the inferiority of dalits was the status quo. In areas where 
Mahars “worked like slaves,” the post-renaming agitations were least severe and most 
Mahar wadis remained untouched.113  
Once the riots started, word spread that this was the moment for suvarnas to 
‘settle scores’ with dalits and no one could stop them; protection was guaranteed from the 
very top.114 In Aurangabad and similar towns, the urban-rural divide was small. Since 
many villages were in close proximity – cycling distance – to urban centers (and since 
dalits took up jobs in other sectors of the economy to resist their subjugation), there was a 
lot of close contact and cultural exchange between them. Many of the students in 
Aurangabad came from rich and middle class farmer families in the rural areas; the fierce 
involvement of the latter in the university issue is explainable.115 These close links in 
regular trade and communications are some of the main reasons why the riots spread to 																																																								
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the villages so quickly. The question to be asked then is why the riots in the urban center 
of Aurangabad did not take the form of bloody street clashes. This militancy of the DPs 
has served as a deterrent to the urban agitators from the SAC. In the past the SAC did not 
plan targets; their grievances were generally directed towards the government, and so all 
their riots and protests concerned only the destruction of public property. What they had 
in common with the DPs was that they functioned only in crisis; they had little visibility 
otherwise. But even though the DPs were disorganized and surfaced only sporadically, 
they could typically organize hundreds of people within minutes.116  
The Parliamentary Committee’s Report stated that the riots, particularly the rural 
ones, were premeditated; “dalits were executed like a military campaign.”117 This was 
atypical of groups like the SAC and their fellow agitators. Pro-agitation stances were 
published in all leading Marathi newspapers, thousands of propaganda letters and 
clandestine leaflets were circulated in Aurangabad and surrounding villages informing 
people to participate in the riots. Many dalits in the villages caught whiff of these 
rumours and fled their homes before the riots began. Several hundred dalits went to the 
police, but to no avail as most policemen were controlled by powerful people in the 
higher echelons of corporate government. After the riots, many dalits identified local 
attackers but also hundreds of outsiders. If the urban agitations had put a halt to the 
public transport system, damaged the roads and destroyed the bridges, how did truckloads 
of agitators from the cities (then in disarray) get to the villages so swiftly, within six days, 
unless there was a degree of planning? How were some wadis and dalit bustis chosen as 
targets, but not others? This is further evidence that the riots cannot be attributed simply 																																																								
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to “high caste rage.”118 Interestingly, the cotton merchants and traders of cities, 
scapegoating their anger of the CMPS onto dalits, generously funded the rioters in the 
cities and provided trucks and weapons for them to enter villages over the next two 
months. The renaming of Marathwada University was a symbolic defeat for the suvarnas. 
The riots were not intended to “wipe out” the dalits – suvarnas were dependent on them 
for labour – but rather to “teach them a lesson.”119 Throughout the agitations, the 
suvarnas shouted slogans reinforcing dalit inferiority and servitude as they viciously 
attacked them.  
Not only did the upper castes successfully squash the feelings of assertiveness that 
had come about in dalits as their demands for equality and liberation started to occupy 
space on the political stage, but they also shattered any possibility of unity between dalits 
and caste Hindu peasants and labourers, who in theory had a lot more to gain if they 
joined forces against their common high caste oppressors. This was, of course, antithetical 
to the interests of the upper caste landed elites, who used caste, tribal loyalty and their 
own cohesion to wage a war against class unity. The caste-driven fractures between 
agricultural labourers and peasants secured the landowners’ monetary and political 
successes. The sugar and cotton baronage can be reframed as the rise of the “kulak” class, 
one that was discreetly established by the upper classes in order to maintain class 
antagonisms at the lower level, disguised as an inherent caste war. The Marathwada riots 
serve as a poignant critique of capitalism and its effects on the rural economy as well as in 
recontextualizing the caste system. Finally, it brings up an immensely relevant and long-
debated issue within Indian discourse: the question of caste versus class struggle.  																																																								
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Is Caste a Barrier to Class Unity? 
---- 
 
Jyotilal Phule, several decades earlier, had emphasized that as long as a rigid 
correlation between jati and occupation existed, caste would always be a material base of 
exploitation in the post-Independence era. According to him, an alliance between dalits 
and OBCs was crucial, echoing the tenets of the BSP. As was the case with the 
Marathwada riots, the conflicts between dalits and shudra-rich farmers was “falling prey 
to the propaganda of the Brahminical caste-class establishment.”120 The solution he 
envisaged was a political economy that would link peasants, dalits and adivasis on the 
basis of their economic exploitation against the caste system. Interestingly, the 
government seemed to take this approach as well, but for different reasons. Gradually 
after the 1950s, caste was intentionally reframed as a class struggle. Terminology like 
“backward classes” was preferred over “backward castes,” even though the latter was a 
more accurate description. After 1941 the Indian Census stopped collecting caste data 
and even Nehru never used the word “caste” in his socialist policy-making. Whether this 
was an attempt to eradicate caste hierarchies or simply brush it aside, it was unsuccessful. 
The ubiquitous question was whether caste served as a barrier to class unity.  
Often, caste-class debates end as “sterile additive analyses” rather than a genuine 
synthesis of the dalit movement’s goals to eradicate the system as a whole, not simply 
reform it. But the “system” requires economic reconceptualization, whereby the 																																																								
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exploitative relations of production must be fundamentally changed on class and caste 
lines. The following is an academic back-and-forth between two scholars that contributes 
modestly to this debate and helps dissect the broader implications of the Marathwada 
riots. 
Dipankar Gupta, a Marxist sociologist, public intellectual and professor at the 
Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, makes the bold argument that class is the 
primary barrier and its eradication will pave the way to addressing caste conflict. In the 
words of Marx himself, “where class struggle is pushed aside, nothing remains as a basis 
for socialism, except ‘true love for humanity’ and other empty phraseology about 
justice.”121 In Nanded, Parbhani and Aurangabad the riot violence had been immense, 
whereas Beed and Osmanabad had remained largely untouched. In these three districts, 
most dalits had migrated to urban zones for jobs, there was a significantly higher degree 
of economic development and progress (in other words, more reservations and more 
competition between Mahars and caste Hindus), and the number of dalits enrolled in 
schools proportional to their population was much higher. Gupta argues that if the 
undercurrents to the violence were based simply on caste prejudice, all five districts 
would have been affected equally. In fact, this entire paper argues that the Marathwada 
riots were a result of and a response to factors much more varied than caste conflict and 
arguably rooted in class struggles. 
According to Gupta, the unemployment rates and economic uncertainty led to the 
fusion of the bourgeoisie classes and poor labourers, who collectively used caste as an 																																																								
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“immediate explanation for their lack of well-being.”122 He criticizes the dalit movements 
for failing to acknowledge this and attributes it to the fact that in large part they were led 
by “educated, urban Mahars with petty bourgeois leanings” that agitated mostly for urban 
benefit, alienating themselves from their rural counterparts. He calls the dalit movements 
of the 1970s nothing short of a “petty bourgeois movement content to clamour within the 
bourgeois parliamentary system.”123  
Conversely, Gail Omvedt, an American-born Indian scholar, sociologist and 
activist, refutes Gupta by arguing that the main contradiction in the rural Marathwada 
riots was more between the agricultural labourers, poor peasants and rich capitalist 
farmers. She states that once the old rentier classes turned to commercial farming, the rise 
of the kulak classes resulted in a shift in the relations of agricultural production, where 
agricultural labourers began to demand higher wages and greater rights. Many poor 
peasants and middle class farmers lost their land to dalit agricultural labourers as a result 
of land concentration processes, causing an influx of caste Hindus into the agricultural 
labour. The rich landed classes used caste to keep these labourers divided, using their 
material differences as the fault lines of caste, and as such, caste did become a barrier to 
class unity. She stresses that caste is a material fact of the relations of production – as the 
intensity of the physical violence shows beyond a doubt –and not simply an ideological 
or superstructural barrier as Gupta makes it out to be. The differences between caste 
Hindu labourers and dalit labourers were manifold and prevented them from being 
unified economically and ideologically. First, caste Hindu labourers were likely to 
possess land, even small holdings. Second, they were more skilled, and were given more 																																																								
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work and longer contracts as a result. Third, they were viewed as “peasants” and not 
derogatorily as “menial labourers.” Fourth, they were not considered inherently polluting 
and so were given work that many dalits were not. The dalits in these cases continued to 
do gaonki work from the times of feudal vethbegar. Fifth, caste Hindu labourers were 
“free” workers, unlike dalit “bonded” labourers. They were in this position because of 
loss of jobs and not as freedom from bondage. Finally, caste Hindu labourers still got to 
live inside the village and were not ostracized socially and culturally like their dalit 
counterparts.124 
Both Gupta and Omvedt approach the question of whether caste is a barrier to 
class unity differently. Gupta uses a traditional Marxist approach and claims that during 
the Marathwada riots, the caste system was “evoked as a ruling class myth that 
functioned to rationalize the exploitation of the subordinate community.” He goes on to 
argue that caste practices “debase toiling classes on an empyrean principle,” which he 
calls a false consciousness that hinders caste unity. This is not an “insuperable” problem, 
but to demystify caste is no easy process. Omvedt, on the other hand, denies Gupta’s 
accusations that her argument implies caste antagonisms as most important and that 
Marxists should put class struggle aside and join the “cultural revolt” against caste. 
Instead, she argues that casteism cannot be solved solely by class struggle in the way that 
Gupta conceptualizes it. Dalits are ideologically and culturally oppressed and at the 
bottom of all caste hierarchies, and that will not change even if India were to become a 
classless society or one that achieves full capitalist development. She asserts that in 
feudal modes of production, economic relations were mediated through caste hierarchies, 
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and while “caste” does not contrast with “class,” it is the form that class took in feudal 
society. She argues for a broader understanding of the class struggle, as one that 
“confronts the class enemy at all levels – social, cultural, economic, religious and 
political – and unites all that can be united.” Like Lenin, she asserts that a social 
revolution cannot be successful without “necessary sections of the petty bourgeois, the 
politically non-conscious proletariat or the semi-political masses.”125 She calls the dalit 
struggle a “radical democratic movement” and states the real question to be asked is 
whether non-dalit working classes should take up the fight against caste oppression and 
align with the existing dalit movement. In her pragmatic approach, she is perhaps right in 
assuming that dalit politics need wider participation to achieve their goals. It is, however, 
counter-intuitive to the deep cultures of protest by the most downtrodden in society 
because it is first and foremost a liberation movement. The master’s tools will not 
dismantle the master’s house.  
What poses the biggest problem is the equally formidable culture of opportunism 
that stifles any honest “democratic” movement at any step of the way. In that sense, 
Dipankar Gupta is correct in identify the Dalit Panthers’ leadership as a petty bourgeois 
movement – in a heuristic sense – seeing that they strayed further and further away from 
their impassioned manifesto to a commonplace quest for local power. Electoral and 
patronage-politics are the most pervasive obstacles to a true “democracy,” whatever that 
may be. At the same time, Omvedt is also correct in identifying the ways caste was used 
to keep class unity on hold – an inevitable product of colonial “divide and rule” politics. 
India as a postcolonial state is far from being democratically decolonized. Omvedt’s 
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assertion that caste is a material reality is evident. Globalization and the influx of 
capitalism have opened up new spaces for dalit politics at the grassroots level, but also 
created space for immense violence. The caste-class debate thrives today because of the 
contradictions on every level of Indian society. The practice of ‘untouchability’ has been 
made illegal in the modern postcolonial state, but it has yet to translate into social and 
cultural acceptance.  
Because caste has become so deeply entrenched in so-called “Indian culture,” 
challenging it is an immensely difficult feat, given the stark disparities among the Indian 
population – fueled by every kind of flame. The Marathwada riots laid bare the economic 
problems that ignited the conflicts “at the heart of the caste doxa.”126 Remove every 
unique economic barrier that creates such harsh material realities for three quarters of the 
Indian population, and caste will not automatically or magically disappear. But perhaps it 
will put all strata of society on a financially equitable footing with which to move 
forward in the process of justice, equality and democracy.  
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CONCLUSION 
The Revolution: Blue, Green and Red 
---- 
 
A few weeks into the Marathwada riots, the “political waters had become so 
muddied it was impossible to see what was at the bottom of the trouble.”127 The build-up 
to the riots itself alluded to the inevitability of the conflict that resulted, yet it fell short in 
explaining them fully. The post-renaming violence did not arise from the 
“straightforward imposition of high caste authority but as a high caste reaction to 
initiatives of the dalits to slough off their historical condition and to rise up in the world. 
The more the dalits resisted their subordination, the more savage the reaction they 
engendered.”128 The suvaranas and other caste Hindus were attempting to push back 
against the rising tide of dalit assertion and restore the old status quo. Therefore, the 
victims of the riots were overwhelmingly Mahars – both because of their allegiance to 
Ambedkar as well as their relative prosperity in raising themselves out of caste 
subordination. They were a newly emergent group in the class spectrum – from poor, 
landless labourers they became middle class professionals. They had a salient middle 
class and a political party of their own, unlike any other scheduled caste. The relative 
ascendancy of the Mahars was visible not just between dalit jatis but also between dalits 
living in the urban cities versus those in the rural areas, as there was a sharp contrast 
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between the two in the ways that social systems were observed and economic activity 
was carried out. 
Consequently, the way the riots manifested in the urban parts of Marathwada was 
distinct from the way they unfolded in the rural parts. In both cases, it was mainly the 
dalits that were deeply affected. Where the urban dalits reacted with fury to the riots, the 
rural dalits were disheartened and acted out of self-preservation. They condemned the 
urban students for inciting crowds and demonstrating but leaving the villagers to suffer 
the wrath of high caste reprisal without offering any help. This did not necessarily imply 
that they were against fighting caste oppression; after all they, too, had been ‘awakened’ 
by Ambedkar’s politics. Rather, in many parts of rural Marathwada before the riots, dalits 
and suvarnas had come to informal agreements to share wells, public parks and hotels. 
Their anger was targeted at being patronized and silenced by their dalit counterparts in 
the cities. Their interests in preserving the precarious status quo were out of concern for 
their own safety – if clashes broke out, dalits in most villages did not have a coherent 
network through which to mobilize, and as such would have been overwhelmed by upper 
caste force, just like they were in the renaming riots. After the riots, all forms of 
cordiality that may have existed between dalits and suvarnas dissolved. Although legally 
abolished, practices of untouchability resurfaced with renewed energy. Rural Mahars 
were no longer allowed to use the same restrooms, hotels, schools or wells. They were 
not hired by any employer, local moneylenders refused to give them money, and even 
local grocery shops refused to sell them food. Surviving on fruits found in the jungle, 
rural dalits felt nothing but a deep sense of deprivation and hopelessness.129 Gradually but 
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inevitably, this led to a “hardening of attitudes and more militant positions” among the 
dalits.130 
In the cities, the attackers were largely from middle castes and lower classes, 
particularly the Maratha-kunbi peasants (“Kunbis” were traditionally non-elite land 
tillers). On average, they were economically backward in similar magnitude as urban 
dalits. In the rural parts, the agitators were a combination of poor suvarna labourers, rich 
rural peasants (a sort of “kulak” class) as well as the upper-caste, rural elite classes of 
farmers and landowners. The riots made it clear that any solidarity and unity that may 
have existed between dalits and non-Brahmins in rural Marathwada was broken by the 
onset of the riots.  
The ingrained caste prejudice of upper caste Hindus was reignited and fueled by 
the structural facets of Marathwada in the 1970s. They revealed the complex historical, 
economic and geopolitical underpinnings that culminated in these attacks. What both the 
urban and rural sectors of Marathwada had in common was the ubiquitous pressure felt 
by the people as a result of the underdevelopment and compounded backwardness of the 
region, as well as the many problems that arose from it. The pattern of violence against 
dalits needs to be understood and interpreted first and foremost in terms of land structure 
and the level of socioeconomic development in Marathwada; it is the agrarian relations 
between labourers and rich farmers that make the social structure so hostile to the 
demands of the subaltern.131 
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The zamindars and landed gentry of Marathwada were virulent towards the dalits 
not simply because of Ambedkar’s movements but because of the fear that they would 
have to lose their land to dalit labourers under laws like the Land Ceiling Act. Because of 
the severe backwardness of the region, whatever little development did take place 
affected the population unequally. The middle and lower classes of suvarnas and Maratha 
kunbis were not able to reap the benefits of development, however small. For them, the 
concessions, quotas and reservations were the primary enemy. 80% of the students at the 
University were dalits from outside of the region, getting fees subsidies and easy 
admission into classes; the suvarnas were left stranded. But because of the caste-driven 
hate induced from above, they took out their frustration on dalits instead of the powerful 
and rich “education lords” that should have been the ones held responsible.132 These 
frustrations at uneven development were not isolated or fleeting occurrences; they were 
born from entrenched, unshakable divisions and disadvantages that ran deep across 
history and found expression in the renaming conflict. In the words of Gopal Guru, “the 
development process had helped a few Marathas siphon off the fruits of development and 
kept some Marathas so backward that even music from a dalit radio set or TV became so 
intolerably strident for these Marathas. Other well-to-do Marathas did not want dalits 
matching their lifestyles.” In either case, the victim was the dalit. 
The question posed earlier about whether the renaming issue actually served to 
further dalit politics is one worth discussing some more. As originally conceived, the 
demand to rename the university was supposed to lead to the emergence of a “corporate 
political identity” of the dalits, in keeping with the capitalist growth of the country. But 
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after the riots, and in fact even after the university changed name in 1994, the dalits as a 
community remain fragmented on parochial and religious lines, enveloped within a 
culture of political opportunism and a Sharad Pawar-prompted debilitation of dalit 
leadership. The fall of the Dalit Panthers in the late 1980s was succeeded by the growth 
of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Manavi Hakk Abhiyan (MHA) nationally. 
Reminiscent of Y.B. Chavan’s purported philosophies, the BSP in particular was a broad 
party meant to represent the Bahujans – “people in the majority” – that included over 
6000 different scheduled castes, tribes, OBCs, and other groups of religious minorities. 
Together they comprised 85% of the country’s population and today the BSP is the third 
largest national party in the country. However, the aftermath of the Marathwada riots and 
the segregation within the region prevented the BSP from successfully establishing a base 
in the state and instead focused on national politics. In Marathwada and in the country 
after Independence, political discourse slowly replaced terms like “exploitation” and 
“oppression” with “marginalization,” and dalit issues made only a “token appearance” in 
electoral politics and discussions of democracy.133 Dalit persons in political office were 
put in charge of minor or otherwise irrelevant ministries in the bureaucracy, and for the 
common dalit population the state apparatus was as hostile as ever.  
The political dalit movements that emerged in the second half of the twentieth 
century, including the Dalit Panthers, in their empirical organization did not tackle the 
discursive power of the upper caste’s very base of wealth: the state machinery itself. 
While dalit activists and leaders went after state power themselves, and rightfully rejected 																																																								
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the “benefits” handed down paternalistically to them, they sought to become part of the 
ruling class through whatever form – armed force, parliamentary power, or bureaucratic 
access – rather than attempt to abolish the ruling class itself. Of course, this was a 
pragmatic decision and the insistence on state power was a way for dalits to lay claim to 
“modernity” and their role in carrying it forward. But corruption, greed and opportunism 
had a greater influence on the dalit leadership’s tactics than their purported common 
goals of liberation. But just as India has had a long, vibrant history, seeing the rise and 
fall of many great empires and leaders, hope for the dalit movement is far from 
destroyed. It is an ongoing project. The dynamism of dalit politics makes it indispensible 
to the cultural process of democratization.134  
 
The fires from the burning bastis will eventually be put out. But from the ashes 
will emerge a new wave of dalit assertion, fiercer and more resilient than ever before.  
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